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We study Guard’s linear logic from the point of view of giving a concrete computational interpreta- 
tion of the logic, based on the Curry-Howard isomorphism. In the case of Intuitionistic linear logic, 
this leads to a refinement of the lambda calculus, giving finer control over order of evaluation and 
storage allocation, while maintaining the logical content of programs as proofs, and computation as 
cut-elimination. In the classical case, it leads to a concurrent process paradigm with an operational 
semantics in the style of Berry and Boudol’s chemical abstract machine. This opens up a promising 
new approach to the parallel implementation of functional programming languages; and offers the 
prospect of typed concurrent programming in which correctness is guaranteed by the typing. 
1. Introduction 
Since its inception, linear logic [12] has offered great promise, as a formalism 
particularly well-suited to serve at the interface between logic and computer science. 
l From the logical side, linear logic combines the symmetries of classical logic, as 
made manifest in Gentzen’s sequent calculus, with the constructive content of 
intuitionistic logic. 
l From the computational side, linear logic offers a logical perspective on computa- 
tional issues such as control of resources and order of evaluation. By contrast, 
extant declarative languages either adulterate their logical content in the search for 
efficiency, or require an elaborate infrastructure of implementation techniques, 
which do not themselves draw inspiration from the mathematical structure of the 
language. 
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The paradigm followed by Girard in seeking to apply linear logic to computation is 
the “CurryyHoward” isomorphism (see e.g. [15]), in which propositions (or logical 
formulae) are interpreted as types, proofs as programs, and the process of normal- 
ization or cut-elimination as computation. This paradigm has been a cornerstone of 
much recent work on the connections between intuitionistic logic, functional pro- 
gramming and category theory (see e.g. [22]). It has by now firmly established itself as 
a major component of the logical foundations of programming. In the case of 
intuitionistic logic, it relates typed ).-calculus (i.e. typed functional programs in 
a canonical syntax) to proofs in intuitionistic logic; and reduction of terms to normal 
form (i.e. program execution) to normalization of proofs. What is particularly satisfy- 
ing about this correspondence in the case of intuitionistic logic is that the formalism 
on the computational side is immediately recognizable as an attractive programming 
paradigm, which has already been extensively developed and enthusiastically ad- 
vocated by a significant community of software practitioners [45, 6, 9, 381. 
What has been lacking to date from the development of linear logic is a comparably 
attractive computational interpretation. Such an interpretation would have two main 
ingredients: 
l An interpretation of proofs as programs, i.e. well-formed expressions in some 
programming notation. 
l An operational semantics for these programs, embodying a clear conception of 
program execution. Such a semantics should be formulated at a suitable level of 
abstraction, unencumbered by implementation details, so that it can serve as 
a reference spec~ficmtion of the language. 
On this basis, linear logic in its computational aspect could be studied in the general 
framework of programming language semantics, as developed with considerable 
success over the last 30 years. The computational intuitions which have been proposed 
in connection with linear logic could be made precise, and its actual advantages as 
a computational formalism assessed in relation to the claims made on its behalf. 
It should be said that this programme runs somewhat counter to that advocated by 
Girard. He has adopted the methodological principle of avoiding the “bureaucracy” 
of syntax [ 141, aiming instead for a “geometrical” view of computation, exemplified by 
the “geometry of interaction” [ 131, which interprets cut-elimination in linear logic by 
iterations of operators in C*-algebras. From that perspective, what we are seeking to 
do here might be seen as a retrogressive step. 
However, we see our work as complementary to Girard’s. By giving a simple, 
concrete computational interpretation of linear logic, which makes connections with 
other computational formalisms apparent, and is immediately meaningful in pro- 
gramming terms, we hope to make linear logic much more accessible to computer 
scientists, and to provide the basis for some substantial applications. At the same time, 
we hope to establish connections with Girard’s geometrical approach, although that 
must be left to future work. 
The further contents of this paper are as follows. In Section 2, we review 
the connections between intuitionistic logic and typed J.-calculus (functional 
programming) and describe the operational semantics of ).-calculus in a style inspired 
by Martin-Liif [29], and currently (as “natural” or “relational” semantics) widely used 
in programming language specification 124, 353. We give the correspondence for both 
the natural deduction and sequent calculus presentations of intuitionistic logic. The 
former is standardly used as a “type inference” system for functional programming, 
while the latter forms the basis for the refinement of intuitionistic logic into linear 
logic. 
In Section 3 we present intuitionistic linear logic (the fragment containing @,+, 
&, 0, !). This fragment gives rise to a refined version of functional programming. We 
present a term calculus of notations for proofs in this fragment, essentially a refine- 
ment of the i.-calculus which allows greater control over computational behaviour, 
while preserving the strict correspondence between terms and proofs. We give an 
operational semantics for this language in the natural semantics style, thus achieving 
our basic aim of giving a computational interpretation of intuitionistic linear logic. 
We study various aspects of this interpretation in the next two sections. In Section 4, 
we sketch some of the possible applications to static program analysis and optimiza- 
tion, and give a detailed description of a (sequential) implementation of the linear term 
calculus, in terms of a variant of the SECD machine [26]. Then in Section 5 we 
establish some of the basic theoretical properties of the calculus, in its second-order 
propositional version. 
We turn to classical linear logic in Sections 668. This should be regarded as the 
main contribution of the present paper. Although the material on intuitionistic linear 
logic is interesting in its own right, it has been included mainly for expository 
purposes. Classical linear logic requires a much more radical departure from the 
functional framework, so going by way of intuitionistic linear logic helps to cushion 
the shock. In Section 6 we introduce pro~fe.~pressions as a notation for proofs in 
classical linear logic and present a concurrent operational semantics in the style of 
Berry and Boudol’s chemical abstract machine [S]. The basic theoretical properties of 
the proof-expression calculus are established in Section 7. Finally, a parallel imple- 
mentation is sketched in Section 8. 
2. Intuitionistic logic and functional programming 
This section essentially reviews standard material, although the style of presenta- 
tion of the operational semantics and the assignment of terms to proofs in the sequent 
calculus are not as widely known as they deserve to be. A good reference for general 
background is [ 151. 
2.1. Natural &duction 
We present natural deduction for intuitionistic logic (strictly speaking for minimal 
logic, but we shall not be pedantic on this point). For ease of comparison with the 
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sequent calculus, we present “natural deduction in sequent form”, in which the objects 
being derived are sequents 
AI,...,A,kA. 
(We use r, d to range over sequences of formulas, including the empty sequence; and 
write r, d for concatenation of sequences.) What distinguishes the system as natural 
deduction is the form of the rules for each connective: these are structured into 
introduction rules and elimination rules. 
Axiom: 
Structural rules: 
(Exchange) 
l-, A, B, d t C 
1-, B, A, d k C 
(Contraction) 
l-, A, AF B rFB 
r,AkB 
(Weakening) ~ 
r,At-B 
Logical rules: 
(AI) 
1-FA rEB 
(AE) 
rFAAB rFAAB 
rt-AAB TEA TFB 
(11) 
r,AtB 
(1E) 
rt-A3B TEA 
I-EAIB rtB 
(V 1) 
l-t-A TFB 
(VE) 
rt-AVB r,AFC r,BFC 
rkAVB Tt-AVB rkc 
Note that all the “action” in the natural-deduction-style logical rules is on the 
right-hand side of the turnstile. Also notice the asymmetry between the rules for 
conjunction and disjunction. 
Using the structural rules, it is easy to derive the following variant of (3 E): 
and hence the cut rule 
which is not a basic rule of natural deduction. 
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2.2. Term assignment .for natural deduction 
We now assign terms of the typed 3.-calculus to natural deduction proofs. From the 
proof-theoretic point of view, the signfiicance of this is to give a “functional interpreta- 
tion” of intuitionistic proofs; this is an embodiment of the Heyting semantics for 
intuitionistic logic, in which formulas (or “propositions”) are interpreted by means of 
their proofs: a proof of a conjunction is a pair of proofs of the conjuncts; a proof of an 
implication A 2 B is a (constructive) function mapping proofs of A to proofs of B; 
a proof of a disjunction A V B is either a proof of A or a proof of B, together with the 
information as to which disjunct was actually proved. Thus, propositions are viewed 
as data types: 
A A B = A x B (Cartesian product), 
A 2 B = A=sB, (function space), 
A V B = A+ B (disjoint union). 
From the functional programming point of view, the programs (terms) have 
a primary interest of their own. From this perspective, what we have is a type inference 
system for functional programs, which assigns types to terms, rather than a logical 
system assigning terms to proofs. Of course, the advantage of an isomorphism is that 
both views can coexist harmoniously. 
We present the term assignment as a version of natural deduction in which the 
objects being derived now have the form 
xl:A 1, . . . , x,:A, I- t:A 
where the xi are distinct variables, and b is a term. We present this system (and all 
others in this paper) in the style of Curry rather than that of Church [4]; i.e. terms 
have no embedded types, and can have many types assigned to them. This choice is 
made for technical convenience rather than necessity, and certainly does not reflect 
any ideological commitment. 
Axiom: 
(14 x:At-x:A 
Structural rules: 
(Exchange) 
I-, x:A, y:B, A t- t:C 
I-, y:B, x:A, d I- t:C 
(Contraction) 
I-,x:A,y:Ak t:B 
(Weakening) 
l-t t:B 
1-, z:A F t[z/x, z/y]:B I-, z: A k t:B 
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Logical rules: 
(AI) 
Tkt:A rtu:B l-l--r:AAB rtt:AAB 
f k(t,u):A A B 
(AE) 
rt-fst(t):A rtsnd(t):B 
(11) 
I-, .u:A k t:B 
(3E) 
l-I-t:AzB f ku:A 
rFix.t:A 3B r F tu:B 
( v 1) 
rFrt:A l-tU:B 
I-t- inl(t):A V B Tt inr(u):A V B 
(V E) 
I-kt:A V B L’s:AFu:C I-,y:Btv:C 
r Fcase t of inl(x) - ulinr(y) * v:C 
2.3. Operational semmtics 
From the proof-theoretic point of view, the next step would be to set up an 
equational theory for terms, reflecting the intended notion of equivalence of proofs; 
and to use this to translate normalization of proofs into reduction of terms to normal 
forms. However, we shall proceed in a different fashion, following a method of 
presenting operational semantics inspired by Martin-Lof [29], and currently widely 
used under the name of natural or relational semantics [24, 351. There are a number of 
reasons for this choice: 
This style of formalization of operational semantics is much better suited to 
specifying realistic programming languages, in which the evaluation strategy is an 
intrinsic part of the language, than an equational theory or term-rewriting system. 
The style is also more robust, since it extends smoothly to languages incorporating 
such features as lazy evaluation and general recursion, in which it is no longer the 
case that every program has a normal form. 
There are technical advantages, as witnessed by our work in Sections 5 and 8. The 
main results are considerably easier to prove. While it may be objected that they are 
weaker than the corresponding results for reduction to normal form, they have 
a wider range of applicability, to situations where the stronger results may actually 
fail. 
l The most telling point is that the Martin-Liif style of operational semantics has 
what the theory of reductions for proofs significantly lacks: the evaluation rules are 
formally inevitable, and write themselves. By contrast, the “commutative conver- 
sions” e.g. for disjunction are unmemorable and awkward. Moreover, the evalu- 
ation rules capture what is actually done in a computation. 
Before presenting the operational semantics for typed i-calculus, we shall explain 
the general concepts underlying this approach. Firstly, there is a classification of 
constructions on terms into two groups: constructors (corresponding to introduction 
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rules) and destructors (corresponding to elimination rules). (This classification, of 
course, goes right back to the pioneers McCarthy [30] and Landin [26], although 
they lacked the proof-theoretic perspective.) Constructors produce information (pieces 
of structured data); destructors coMsulne it. The basic unit of computation (reduction 
step) is when a destructor meets a corresponding constructor; the author has found it 
suggestive to think of particles of information and anti-information colliding and 
annihilating each other, possibly generating some new particles ~ a communication 
event. Note that the operational significance of type checking is precisely to ensure 
that a constructor of one type never collides with a destructor of a different type ~ 
i.e. that the consumer can always plug in to the producer, and communication 
occur. 
We think of computation as applying only to programs, i.e. closed terms. The 
overall effect of a computation is to reduce a program to a canonical form, in which 
some quantity of information has been made explicit, by being put into constructor 
form. At this point, a bifurcation occurs, between lazy (including call-by-name) 
evaluation ~ the principle of producing as little information as possible at each stage 
of evaluation - and eager (including call-by-value) evaluation, in which as much as 
possible is produced. Each of these determines an evaluation strategy, and hence an 
operational semantics. The proof system in itself does not enforce a strategy on us. 
This is not too surprising, since exterzsional differences between these strategies only 
show up in the J-calculus in the presence of nonterminating programs (see e.g. [39]), 
and under the strict correspondence of typed programs with proofs, we have strong 
normalization, so that all programs ~ and indeed all strategies - terminate. 
(However, it is one of the most notable features of linear logic that a clear 
perspective on lazy vs. eager evaluation is provided there, even at the pure logical 
level, and in the absence of divergence. See Section 3.) 
For each of the lazy and eager strategies we shall specify a set of canonical forms 
and present the operational semantics in terms of an evaluation relation tuc, to be read 
as “1 evaluates (or converges) to canonical form c”. 
Lazy evaluution 
Here the canonical forms are all programs (closed terms) with a constructor at the 
top. 
Canonical forms: 
ix.t (f> u> inl(t) inr(u) 
Evaluation relation: 
This is defined inductively, as the least satisfying the following clauses: 
tU(u, v) uuc tlj(u, v) vuc 
(t3 u>u ccu> fst(t)ljc snd(t)Jc 
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tlJ/lx.u u[u/x]Uc 
ix.tu2x.t tul,lc 
inl(t)Uinl(t) inr(u)Uinr(u) 
tl,Iinl(w) u[w/x]lJc 
case t of inl(x) * ulinr(y) 3 z;Ijc 
tUinr(w) uCw/~lUc 
case t of inl(x) * ulinr(y) * vI,Ic 
Eager ez;aluation 
Canonical forms: 
2x.t CC? d) inl(c) inr(d) 
where c, d are canonical forms. 
Note that any abstraction ix.t is canonical, since we only evaluate programs, and 
t may not be closed. This exactly mirrors what is done in actual eager evaluation 
languages, e.g. ML [35]. 
Evaluation relation: 
tUc ul,ld tU<c, d> tU<c, d) 
(t, u>U(c, d) fst(t)Uc snd(t)ud 
tU1.x.c uuc u[c/x]lJd 
ix.tu2x.r tuljd 
tUc uUd 
inl(t)Uinl(c) inr(u)Uinr(d) 
tUinl(c) u[c/x]Ud 
case t of inl(x) S- ujinr(y) + vl,ld 
tUinr(c) c[c/y]Ud 
case t of inl(x) + ulinr(y) * cl,ld 
2.4. Sequent calculus 
We now review the sequent calculus presentation of intuitionistic logic. The objects 
derived in this calculus are exactly the same sequents r t- A as in (our version of) 
natural deduction. The difference appears in the form of the rules. Firstly, the Cut rule 
is taken as primitive in sequent calculus. The Axiom and structural rules are as before. 
The logical rules are different: they are structured into lef and right rules rather 
than into introduction and elimination rules. The right rules are the same as the 
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introduction rules of natural deduction. The left rules introduce the principal connect- 
ive on the left of the turnstile. 
Logical rules: 
(AR) 
I-t-A At-B 
f,AtAA B 
(ALI 
f,AtC r,Bl-C 
I-,AABtC T,AABtC 
(V RI 
I-I-A l-l--B 
(V L) 
I-,AtC I-,BtC 
TkAVB I-I-AVB l-,AVBtC 
The importance of sequent calculus and the symmetries it brings to light has been 
forcefully argued by Girard [lS]. These symmetries are only partially on view in the 
intuitionistic sequent calculus, which incorporates an important asymmetry, in that 
only a single formula can appear on the right-hand side of the turnstile. This is 
intimately linked with the possibility of a functional interpretation for intuitionistic 
logic, since it corresponds to the asymmetric nature of functions with respect to inputs 
(premises) and outputs (conclusions). 
However, the symmetry that does exist between the left and right rules can be nicely 
related to our earlier discussion of constructors and destructors. Constructors (gener- 
ated by right rules) build structure on the output 
while destructors (generated by left rules) decompose structure on the input 
The most familiar instance of this latter pattern is the conditional, which is general- 
ized to the case statement in typed i.-calculus; more generally yet, destructors corre- 
spond to pattern-matching, which has become an important feature of functional 
programming languages [6,9,45]. For function types, the destructor is application, 
which decomposes a function into its graph. 
Term assignment ,for sequent calculus 
We now show how terms can be assigned to proofs in the sequent calculus. The 
terms being assigned and the form of the sequents are, of course, exactly the same as 
for natural deduction. The point is to show the actual assignments corresponding to 
the sequent calculus rules. Although in principle these follow automatically from the 
known translations of sequent calculus into natural deduction (see e.g. [15]), they do 
not seem to be as well known as they might be. 
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Cut rule: 
r F t:A x:A, A F u:B 
S. Ahrmshy 
r, ‘4 t u[t/x]:B 
Logical rules: 
(AR) 
rtt:A Lltu:Il 
r,At(t,u):A AB 
(ALI 
I-, x:A t t:C 1-, y:B t u:C 
T,z:A A Btt[fst(z)/x]:C T,z:A A BFu[snd(z)/y]:C 
(3R) 
r,x:Att:B rt-t:A x:B,dFu:C 
l-kix.t:A3B 
(IL) 
r,f:A3B,d tu[(ft)/x]:c 
i-t t:A rFu:B 
(‘JR) 
r t inl(t):A V B r F inr(u): A V B 
(VL) 
r,.v:AFu:C r,y:BFc:C 
T,z:A V Bt-case z of inl(x) + ulinr(y) a c:C 
Note that terms generated by cut-free proofs are in normul,form; in particular, terms 
generated by the left rules have variables in the head position, so no redexes are 
created. Redexes only arise as a result of the substitutions performed by applications 
of the cut rule. Thus all computation is concentrated into the process of cut 
elimination. 
3. Intuitionistic linear logic 
The basic idea of linear logic [ 123 is to control the use of resources. In the functional 
framework, a resource may be taken to be a piece of information ~ of data ~ supplied 
as an input to a computation. The structural rules of intuitionistic logic (excluding the 
trivial exchange rule) allow us to copy resources (Contraction) and to discard them 
(Weakening): 
I-, x:A, y:A t t:B I-Ft:B 
(Contraction) 
i-,z:Att[z/x,z/y]:B 
(Weakening) r z. A t t: B 
> . 
Specifically, Contraction allows multiple occurrences of a variable to appear in the 
proof term, while Weakening allows variables to be introduced as premises which do 
not appear in the proof term at all. 
Linear logic arises by dropping these two structural rules. This means that each 
input must be used exactly once in producing the output. This has immediate 
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implications for the interpretation of the logical connectives. Firstly, we find that two 
distinct interpretations of conjunction, or in programming terms a type of pairs of 
values, arise: 
If we wish to use both components of the pair, on the unique occasion when we use 
the input, then we lose the ability to project. This leads to the multiplicative version 
of conjunction, the tensor product A 0 B. 
If we wish to project, then on the unique occasion when we use the input, we must 
choose to take either the first OY the second projection, and this is the only part of 
the input we will ever see. So the additive conjunction A&B appears as a kind of 
choice - an “external” choice in the terminology of CSP [ 191, since it is made by the 
consumer of the datum. 
The disjoint sum (additive disjunction) A @ B appears as an internal choice, since it 
is at the discretion of the producer of the datum whether the choice is made from 
A ~ a value of the form inl(t), or from B ~ a value of the form inr(u). 
The linear implication A + B is the type of functions which use their argument 
exactly once, internalizing linear inference. 
These connectives by themselves are far too weak to provide useful expressive 
power. This is regained by reintroducing weakening and contraction in a controlled 
form, not as omnipresent structural rules, but reflected into a datatype, the exponen- 
tial !A (“Of course A”). The effect is to make as many copies of a value of type 
A available as may be needed. 
That we have recovered adequate expressive power is witnessed by the fact that 
intuitionistic logic can be interpreted in linear logic with the above connectives. In 
particular, intuitionistic implication is recovered by 
AxB=!A-B. 
This decomposition of implication (in programming terms, of the function type) is 
one of the most interesting aspects of linear logic. 
We now flesh out these intuitive ideas by giving the sequent calculus formalization 
of intuitionistic linear logic. 
Axiom: 
(Id) - 
AFA 
Structural rule: 
(Exchange) 
r, A, B, A t C 
I-,B,A,AFC 
Cut rule: 
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Logical rules: 
I-FA 
(1R) tr (IL) ~ r,lFA 
t--R) r;;‘pB 
(AR) 
rtA I-t-B 
rkA&B 
(OL) 
I-, A, B t C 
r,A@BFC 
t--L) 
TEA B,dtC 
r A 
) -B,dFC 
(AL) 
1-,AtC r,Btc 
r,A&BFC r,A&BtC 
TEA I-FB 
(ORI (0 L) 
r,AFC I-,BkC 
rkA@B rtA@B r,A@BFC 
!TFA 
(!R) ~ 
r,AFB 
!TI-!A 
(Dereliction) 
r,!AtB 
(!r means a sequence of the form ! AI,. . , ! Ak.) 
r,!A,!AtB rFB 
(Contraction) 
1-,!AkB 
(Weakening) 
r,!AkB 
The essence of the distinction between the additive and multiplicative connectives is 
conveyed by the fact that d@rent contexts are combined, without interaction, in 
(0 R), (- L), while the fame contexts are used in (&R) and (0 L). This reflects the fact 
that in the additives a choice is made, between one of the components of a pair for &, 
or one of the guards in a case for 0; so the Qume inputs must be used in both 
alternatives, to ensure that each input is used exactly once in producing the output. 
Note also the key role of the left rules in defining the !-type; the proper treatment of 
these rules is the technical crux in our computational interpretation of intuitionistic 
linear logic. 
The linear term calculus 
We now give an assignment of terms to proofs in intuitionistic linear logic. The 
calculus from which these terms are drawn is a refinement of the i.-calculus. A key role 
is played by pattern-matching constructs, corresponding to left rules of the logic. One 
_ minor ~ complication is that the syntax of terms is not context-free, but must reflect 
linearity construints, i.e. syntactic constraints on occurrences of variables correspond- 
ing to the semantic constraint that inputs are used exactly once. 
To formalize these notions, it is convenient to use an auxiliary syntactic category of 
patterns. We use X, Y, Z to range over finite sets of variables. Now PX, the set of 
patterns with variables in X, is defined as follows: 
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We can now define TX, the linear terms with free variables in X, inductively as 
follows: 
tE9-x, LIE?*, Xn Y=@ * t 0 u, tuE.‘T~“, 
t, UEFx =a (t, U)Ec& 
tEY-x a inl(t), inr(t), !tE.FX 
tEFxvl,;, xgx =a lX.&Fx 
tEFx, PEPp,, UEFY”Z, XnZ= YnZ=Q) 
a let t be p in UE&~~ 
t~~~,u~~~=,(,:,v~~~,,(,.:,XnZ={x,y}nZ=~ 
a case t of inl(x) * ulinr(y) * vE&_~ 
We now present the assignment of linear terms to proofs in intuitionistic linear 
logic, in the same style as the term assignment for sequent calculus given in the 
previous section. Our sequents now have the form 
x,:A ,,...,xk:Aktt:A 
where the Ai are linear formulae (built from the connectives 1, 0, +, &, 0, !), the Xi 
are distinct variables, and tEF_,, X = (x1, . . . , xk}. Note that the rules presented below 
are subject to the implicit constraint that the linearity conditions for well-formedness 
of terms are satisfied. This constraint can always be met, e.g. by using distinct 
variables for all instances of the Axiom. 
Axiom: 
(W 
x:A I- x:A 
Structural rule: 
(Exchange) 
I-,x:A,y:B,Akt:C 
I-,y:B,x:A,Akt:C 
Cut rule: 
Tt-t:A x:A,d Fu:B 
I-, A t- u[t/x]:B 
Logical rules: 
(1R) ~ (IL) 
l-l-t:A 
F*:l r,z:lt-let z be*int:A 
(OR) 
Tkt:A dFu:B r,x:A,y:Bkt:C 
r,Att@u:A@B 
(OL) 
r,z:A@Btlet z be x@yin t:C 
(-R) 
r,x:A+t:B Tkt:A x:B, AFu:C 
l-t ix.t:A- B 
(- L) 
T,f:A+ B, A k u[(ft)/x]:C 
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C&R) 
l-Et:.4 TFu:B 
I-F (t, u):A&B 
(AL) 
f, x:.4 F t:C 
r,z:A&Bk let z be (x,-) in t:C 
r, y:B k t:C 
r,z:A&Bt-let z be (-,y) in t:C 
(OR) 
l-tt:A l- F u:B 
rt-inl(t):A@B rt-inr(u):A@B 
(OL) 
r,x:Aku:C r,y:Bkv:C 
r,z:A@Bt-case z of inl(x) =S ulinr(y) * v:C 
(!R) 
!TFt:A 
!Tk!t:!A 
(Dereliction) 
I-,x:AFt:B 
r.z:!At- let z be !x in t:B 
T,x:!A,y:!Ak t:B 
(Contraction) r, z:!A F let z be x(a;y in t:B 
(Weakening) 
Tl-t:B 
r, z:!A k let z be ~ in t:B 
Operational semantics 
We now give an operational semantics for the linear term calculus in exactly the 
same style, and with the same supporting intuitions as the semantics of the j_-calculus 
given in the previous section. However, one notable difference emerges, as immediate 
evidence of the more refined computational content of the linear types. Whereas 
intuitionistic logic was perfectly neutral as to which evaluation strategy to adopt for 
the i.-calculus, in linear logic the logical structure of the types gives a clear indication 
as to which form of evaluation to employ: 
For a term of tensor type A 0 B we know that any consumer (e.g. a destructor 
context let [.I be x @ y in U) will evaluate this term to a pair, and use both 
components. This clearly indicates eager evaluation. Similarly, a term of type A - B 
must evaluate to an abstraction, which when applied to any argument will evaluate 
it exactly once. Evaluation of the argument exactly once is the slogan of call- 
by-value [37]. Finally, any consumer of a term of type A @ B will evaluate it to 
a term of the form inl(t) or inr(t), and then use t in evaluating the appropriate arm 
of a case statement; so once again, eager evaluation is indicated. 
On the other hand, a value of type A&B will evaluate to a pair, exactly one 
component of tvhich will be used in any given context. Since we cannot predict which 
component will be used, it is clear that evaluating either component in advance of 
their actual use will lead in general to redundant computation. Thus lazy evalu- 
ation is indicated here. Again, a value of type ! A may be discarded altogether, so 
evaluation in advance of actual use may lead to redundant computation, and lazy 
evaluation is indicated. 
Thus, we get a classification: 
. 0, --3 @ (eager evaluation) 
0 &,! (lazy evaluation). 
What is particularly interesting is that when we interpret the intuitionistic types 
AxB = A&B 
we see that the intuitionistic function type will be operationally call-by-name (lazy), 
since its argument is “frozen” by the lazy evaluation of the !A type. So the mixed 
evaluation strategy of the linear types, incorporating a high degree of eager evalu- 
ation, supports lazy evaluation at the higher level of the intuitionistic types. One 
might say that this gives a rational reconstruction, in logical terms, of the standard 
method for implementing lazy evaluation on top of an eager evaluation strategy, as 
introduced by Landin [27], and used in the SECD and CAM machines [lS, 221. This 
idea is standardly modelled in denotational semantics by /iftiny [40], i.e. 
A*B = A,-B 
where A-B is the type of pcrrtial (or alternatively strict) functions. This account 
requires the presence of divergent programs; the linear decomposition 
A*B = !A-‘B 
does not. 
With these motivating remarks, we now present the operational semantics. 
Canonical forms: 
(t, U) !t 
* c@d ix. t inl(c) inr(d) 
where c, d are canonical 
Evaluation relation: 
tU* uuc 
*u* let f be*in true 
tuc uud rUc 0 d uCc/x, d/ylUe 
t@ul,lc@d let t be x @y in uUe 
tu2x.c uuc v[c/x]Ud 
ix. t u ix. t tuljd 
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tU<u, w> vuc uCc/xlUd 
(t, u>U(4 u> let t be (x,_) in uljd 
tU(Q w> wuc uCc/ylUd 
let t be (-,y) in uUd 
tuc UUd 
inl(t)Uinl(c) inr(u)Uinr(d) 
tUinl(c) u[c/x]lJd 
case t of inl(x) * ulinr(y) = vljd 
tlJinr(c) u[c/y]lJd 
case t of inl(x) + ulinr(y) => vljd 
tU!v vuc u[c/x]ljd 
!tU!t let t be !x in uljd 
tU!u uuc tU!v u[!u/x, !u/y]Uc 
let r be _ in uuc let t be x&y in uuc 
These rules codify the previous discussion in a very direct fashion. Note that the 
rules corresponding to Contraction and Weakening, respectively copy and discard 
their inputs. 
4. Pragmatics and implementation 
In this section, we sketch some of the promising applications to program analysis 
and optimization opened up by the computational interpretation of intuitionistic 
linear logic presented in the previous section. We also describe an SECD machine 
implementation of the linear calculus. 
Logical compilation 
We have already mentioned the translation of intuitionistic logic into intuitionistic 
linear logic. The full translation of formulas is as follows: 
(A3B)c = !A”-B” 
(A A B)” = X&B” 
(A v B)” = !A” 0 !B” 
It is important to note that the translation works not just at the level of theorems, or 
even provable sequents, but of proofs. That is, every proof of a sequent rF A in 
intuitionistic sequent calculus can be translated into a proof of !F F A” in intuitionis- 
tic linear logic. This in turn induces a translation from A-terms into linear terms. This 
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throws up an interesting aspect of the CurryyHoward isomorphism which I have not 
seen discussed in the literature: an interpretation of one logic L1 into another L, at the 
level of proofs induces a compiler from the programs corresponding to proofs in L1 to 
programs of L2. Of course, the correctness of this compiler should follow directly from 
logical properties of the interpretation. In particular, it seems appropriate to speak of 
compiling R-terms into linear terms, since the linear types are finer-grained, and 
“lower-level” in the programming sense. 
We will not describe the translation explicitly here; see [12] for details. The main 
points will be sufficiently clear from the following examples. 
Examples. Consider the S and K combinators: 
S = j..L 9, x.(.fxk7x), K=i.x, y.x, 
Neither of these terms in linear: S uses x twice, K discards J’. However, consider the 
following linear terms: 
S’=iJ y, z.let z be xc&y in (,fx)(gy), K’=j.x, z.let z be _ in x. 
We can derive the following typing judgements: 
ä S’:(!a-B-;‘)-_;(!riP)-!x-;, 
t- K’:a-!/I-r 
Logic-based progrum analysis 
The above examples illustrate a further point: the typings obtained are the most 
general for the given terms. They “optimize” the types which would be obtained by the 
uniform translation of S and K into linear logic, i.e. 
By introducing fewer !-types, we increase the possibilities of eager (possibly parallel) 
evaluation; of course, the justification for these “improved” typings is that e.g. in K’, 
x is actually used. But this is exactly the kind of information that strictness analysis 
tries to extract [2]. 
There are other uses for the information made explicit by the linear types. If we 
know that a value is never shared (as it will not be unless it is of a !-type) then we can 
safely update it in place on the (necessarily unique) occasion when we access it; so we 
get a handle on “in-place update analysis” [2]. We can also consider refinements of 
the !-type, in which instances of! are indexed by expressions with describe patterns of 
usage in more precise ways. This has been done with reference to complexity theory in 
[16], where a system of bounded linear logic is described, in which ! is graded by 
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“resource polynomials”. This leads to a term assignment in which exactly the poly- 
nomial-time computable functions are typable. Again, there should be connections 
with “complexity analysis” as in [42]. 
The general framework suggested by these ideas might be called “logic-based 
program analysis”, by analogy with the already well-established subject of semantics- 
based program analysis [2, 173. (Of course, the two approaches should be com- 
plementary.) The real applicability of this approach remains to be demonstrated, but 
it looks genuinely promising, and a number of researchers have already made 
preliminary investigations along these lines [25,20,47]. Our contribution is to sug- 
gest that the linear term calculus introduced in the previous section may form a good 
medium for performing static analysis and optimization. One may start from a stan- 
dard functional program, translate it by the uniform method into the linear calculus, 
and then try to “linearize” it, i.e. to minimize the usage of the exponential types. This 
should provide a sound basis for performing many useful optimizations. 
The linear SECD machine 
We will now describe an implementation of the linear term calculus by a variant of 
the SECD machine [26]. Although some possibilities for parallel evaluation of the 
calculus do exist, the implementation we shall describe is purely sequential. (In any 
case, the potential for parallel execution is much greater for classical linear logic, 
which is treated in Sections 668.) 
We will follow the very lucid exposition of the (standard) SECD machine given in 
[18] fairly closely. The machine is based on a list-structured store. We shall use 
Turner’s notation [44] for list operations: 
Cl for the empty list 
x: 1 for infix cons 
[x,, . , x,] for x1: . . ..x.:[]. 
The objects manipulated by the machine are inductively defined as follows: 
l A code is a list of instructions. 
l An instruction is one of the forms 
PUSHENV HD TL 
RET PUSH POP 
MAKEFCL(C) AP 
UNIT UNUNIT PAIR UNPAIR 
MAKECCL(C1, C2) FST SND 
INL INR CASE(C1, Cd 
MAKEOCL(C) READ DUP 
where c, cl, c2 are codes. 
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l A value is one of the forms 
* (CI>U2) inl(u) inr(v) fcl(c, e) ccl(c,, c2, e) ocl(c, e) 
where U, ur , c2 are values, c, c1 , c2 are codes, and e is an environment. (Values of the 
form fcl(c, e), ccl(c,, c2, e), ocl(c, e) are called function, choice and of course clos- 
ures, respectively.) 
l An environment is a list of values. 
The state of the machine is determined by four registers, s, e, c, d: 
l s is the current expression evaluation stack; evaluation terminates with the result- 
ing value at the top of the stack. 
l e is the environment giving the values of the free variables of the current expression. 
l c is the code corresponding to the current expression. 
l d is a dump, i.e. a stack of suspended procedure activations, represented as [s, e, c] 
triples. 
The operation of the machine is described by transition rules specifying the effect of 
each instruction; see Fig. 1. Note that each instruction can obviously be implemented 
in constant time on a conventional machine. 
S, e, PUSHENV:C, d 
(r:/):s,e,H~:~,d 
(r:/):S,e,TL:c,d 
L‘:S. e, RET:C, [s’, e’,c’]:d 
t’:s,e.PUSH:(.,d 
s, v:e, pop:c, d 
S, e, MAKEFCL(C’):C, d 
s,e,UNIT:c,d 
*:s,e,UNUNIT:C,d 
l~r%‘:s,e,PAIR:c,d 
(L., W):S, e, lJNPAlR:C,d 
fcl(c’, e’):s,c:e,k=:c,d 
.s,e,MAKECCL(cl, c,):c,d 
CCl(C1,CZ,e’):s,e,FST:(.,r~ 
ccl((.,,c2, e’):.%e.SND:c,d 
r:s,r,INL:c,d 
r:s.e,lNR:c,d 
inl(r):s,e,cAsP(c,,cz):c,d 
inr(c):s.e,CASE(c,,c2):c,d 
s, e, MAKEOCL(C’):C, d 
Ocl(~‘,e’):s,e,READ:c,d 
r:s, e, DUP:C, d 
- e:s,e,c,d 
- c:s,e,c,d 
- l:s,e,c,d 
- c:s’,e’,c’,d 
- s,r:e,c,d 
- s, e, c, d 
- fcl(c’, e): s, e, c, d 
- *:s,e.c.d 
- s. e,c,d 
- (u, w):s, e, c, d 
- r:rv:s.e,c,d 
- [I, r:e’, c’, [s, e, c]:d 
- ccl(c,,c,,e):s,e,c,d 
- [],e’,c,,[s,e,c]:d 
- [],e’,c,,[s,e,c]:d 
- inl(v):s,r,c,d 
- inr(t,):s,e,c,d 
- [],c:e,c,,[s,e,c]:d 
- [].u:e,c,,[s,e,c]:d 
- ocl(c’,e):s,e,c,d 
- [I, e’, c’, [s, e, c] :d 
- i::r:s,e,c,d 
Fig. I. Linear SECD machine transitions 
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We can now define a compiler from linear terms to SECD codes. More precisely, we 
define a function t * I which, for each linear term tE& and list of variables 1 such that 
every variable in X occurs in 1, yields a code for the linear SECD machine. 
The definition is by induction on the structure oft. (Notation: we use infix 1 for list 
concatenation.) 
.Y* l= [PUSHENV]/ [TL,...,TL]~ [HD] 
where n is the index of the first occurrence of x in 1 (starting from 0). 
**I= [UNIT] 
lett be*in ~*/=~*~I[uNuNIT]III*I 
t@u*l=r*l~u*l~[~~~~] 
fett beX@yin u*/=t*/l[UNPAIR.PUSH.PUSH]IU*X:y:/I[POP.POP] 
r,X.t*/=[MAKEFCL(t*X:/l[POP.RET])] 
tu*!=u*/I[PUSH]lt*/I[AP] 
(t,U)*I=[MAKEccL(t*lI [RET]],u*~~[RET]) 
let t be (x_) in ~*~=~*I/[FsT.PusH]Iu*X:II[POP] 
letr be (_,y) in u*I=~*II[sND.PusH]Iu*~:II[PoP] 
inl(t)*l=t*I/[~~~] 
inr(t) * I= t * 1) [INR] 
case t of inl(x) * u( inr(y) * u*l=t*ll [CASE(C~, c2)] 
where 
C,=u*X:/j[POP,RET] 
C2=L'*y:/I [POP.RET] 
!t* I= [MAKEOCL(~* 11 [RET])] 
lett be !xin u*~=~*~I[READ.PusH]Iu*X:~I[POP] 
let t be ~ in u*l=u*l 
lett bex@yin u*I=~*~~[DuP,PusH,PusH]Iu*x:~:II[PoP.PoP] 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
The correctness of the implementation with respect to the operational semantics can 
be stated as follows. Write t* for t*[], t closed;also, ifc is a code and u a value,write 
clufor 
Cl> Cl> G Cl -* Cal, Cl? Cl? Cl. 
Correctness of the implementation 
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For all typable programs t, 
tuc * 3!u.(t*~u&c*~zl). 
We will not attempt to prove correctness here. The main point is that we have an 
implementation-independent reference semantics with respect to which correctness 
can be formulated. 
Yves Lafont has described an implementation of intuitionistic linear logic in terms 
of a linear abstract machine [25], which is related to our machine in much the same 
way that the Categorical Abstract machine is related to the standard SECD machine 
(see e.g. [22]). The reader is referred to [25] for an interesting discussion of the 
implications of an implementation of this kind for storage allocation, in particular for 
the elimination of garbage collection. 
However, our implementation is by no means committed to complete avoidance of 
sharing. Our DUP instruction, interpreted in the usual way on a list-structured 
memory, creates a copy of the pointer at the top of the stack, thus implementing the 
copying of the !-type by sharing. With a little additional work, we can ensure that the 
standard function type A =>B = !A ----c B is implemented by the standard call- 
by-need technique [38]. We shall briefly describe how this can be done. Firstly, we 
introduce a new instruction UPD, and a new form of value ocv(u), representing the 
“consolidation” of a value into a !-closure. The compilation of ! t is changed by 
replacing RET by UPD. The transition for READ is replaced by the following two 
transitions: 
l::OCi(C', e'):S, e, READ:C,d- [I, e', c', 1: [s, e, c] :d 
ocv(u):s,e, READ:C, d- zj:s, e, c, d 
Here the notation l::ocl(c’, e’) means that 1 is the location of the cell representing the 
!-closure. The transition for UPD is 
c‘:s, e, UPD:C, l:[s', e',c'] :d- v:s’, e’, cl, d 
where I := ocv(c) 
Thus, in this transition the location of the !-closure is over-written by the consolidated 
value. 
In this approach, just the values of the nonexponential types would be implemented 
without sharing. This seems to offer a better balance for sequential implementations 
than Lafont’s approach, and is consistent with the idea of using linear types to 
increase efficiency as described in the previous subsection. By contrast, the situation is 
rather different in a parallel implementation, where the avoidance of sharing has 
potentially much greater benefits. Our concurrent operational semantics for classical 
linear logic, as presented in Section 6, does avoid sharing in a thorough-going fashion; 
parallel implementation is discussed in Section 8. 
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5. Basic theory of the linear calculus 
The systems we have considered so far have been very weak in expressive power, 
corresponding in logical terms to the intuitionistic propositional calculus, and in 
programming terms to the simple typed i-calculus, together with their linear re- 
finements. We shall now make a deceptively simple-looking extension, which in fact 
generates an enormous increase in expressive power. This is the addition of second- 
order propositional quantifiers, or in programming terms of (impredicative) quantifi- 
cation over types, enabling the definition of polymorphic functions. In the implicit 
typing approach we are using here, this extension looks particularly simple, since it 
does not appear at the term level at all, following the philosophy that types are 
compile-time constraints, and are not used in the actual computation. (This reflects 
current practice in languages such as ML [35], Miranda [44] and Haskell [21].) 
The syntax of formulas is extended with propositional variables a, /J ;’ and the 
universal quantifier V’a.A. The system ILL (i.e. the sequent formulation of linear logic 
as given in Section 3) is extended to its second-order version ILL, by the rules 
O”R) 
l-t-A 
(*I w-1 
I-, A [B/r] t C 
rt-VE.A f, V2.A kc 
where the right rule is subject to the side-condition (*) that % does not appear free in r. 
The linear term calculus is unchanged, and the term assignment extended to I LL2 as 
follows: 
(V’R) 
l-t-t:A l-, x:A[B/a] t t:C 
l-t t:v’x..4 
(*) (V’L) 
I-, x:Vx.A k t:C 
Of course, the operational semantics is left unchanged. 
This system can be seen as a refinement of system F [ 151, i.e. the second-order 
intuitionistic propositional calculus with its term assignment (in the implicit typing 
version), and we accordingly name it system LF (“linear system F”). System F can be 
interpreted into LF by the obvious extension of the translation from intuitionistic 
logic into ILL we have already mentioned. The significance of this is that system F can 
represent all provably total recursive functions of second-order arithmetic [15]. 
Moreover, inductive types such as lists and trees can be encoded in system F. For 
good surveys of programming in system F, see [ 15,4 1,221. 
Determinac’y and convergence 
We now turn to the basic metatheory of system LF. The two major results for 
system F are undoubtedly that it satisfies the ChurchPRosser and strong normaliz- 
ation properties [ 151. These results concern reduction, and apply to all strategies. The 
ChurchPRosser property implies that all reduction strategies lead to the same result 
(normal form) when they terminate, while strong normalization says that all strategies 
do in fact terminate. What analogous properties can be formulated in terms of our 
style of operational semantics? Corresponding to the Church-Rosser property, we 
have: 
Determinacy: For all closed t, tuc and tud implies c=d; while corresponding to 
strong normalization, we have: 
Conwrgence: For all closed t typable in system LF (i.e. for which 
t- t:A 
can be derived in LF for some type A), tuc for some c. 
These two properties together say that evaluation, which primafacie is just a binary 
relation between programs and canonical forms, is in fact a total function on typable 
programs. 
Since these properties are clearly weaker than CR and SN, why study them? 
l Firstly, these results extend smoothly to situations where the stronger properties 
actuallyfail. For example, in Section 7 we will prove corresponding results for our 
computational interpretation of classical linear logic, while the Church-Rosser 
property&i/s for the theory of reduction, as applied to sequent proofs or proof nets 
[ 121. Again, if we extend the calculus with general recursion, strong normalization 
will definitely be lost, while Convergence can be refined into semantic soundness 
[8] plus computational adequacy [31]. 
l As already explained, the evaluation relation reflects the intrinsic computational 
content of the linear types, and so is the natural object of study. 
l The proofs of Determinacy and Convergence are considerably simpler and less 
technical than the proofs of CR and SN. 
Firstly, we have the following theorem. 
Theorem 5.1. System LF satisjies Determinacy. 
Proof. By induction on the length of the inference that tuc. If t has any form other 
than a case, at most one clause in the inductive definition of the evaluation relation is 
applicable to it. Otherwise, by the induction hypothesis at most one of the two rules 
corresponding to (0 L) is applicable. 0 
We now turn to Convergence. Our proof is a simplified and suitably modified 
version of Girard’s original proof of SN for system F [l 11; see [lo] for a good 
exposition. 
The idea is to use the evaluation relation to give a realizability semantics for types. 
We take a semantic type to be a set of closed linear terms, i.e. a subset of Y=Y@. We 
interpret the linear connectives over y(Y) as follows: 
I = (ts,Y 1 rU*) 
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while for F: $?(T)+~J (Z), we define 
V(F)= n (F(U)1 UE$>(Y)}. 
These definitions induce a semantic function 
l.1 :TExp+TEnv+p(F) 
where TExp is the set of linear type expressions, and TEnv = TVar+ go (F ) is the set of 
type environments mapping type (or propositional) variables to semantic types. 
We can now give a realizability interpretation for sequents: 
?c:Tl= t:A o VqeTEnv, u~[[rIi~.(t[u/x]~[[AIIrl), 
and state the basic result: 
Theorem 5.2 (Realizability). If rE t: A is derivuble in system LF, then r I= t: A. 
Proof. By induction on the derivation of f E t: A in LF. Three cases will illustrate the 
argument quite sufficiently. 
(1). 
(6- I-1 
rt-t:A .u:A, dEu:C 
1-, f: A+ B, A F u[(.ft)/x]:C 
Let q, U, E, w be given with ti~[rl v, ti~[dj v, WE[A+ Bl I?. By induction hypo- 
thesis .?:rl= t:A, and so t[ii/.f]E[Ajy; together with WE[A-Bjq, this implies 
wt [u/x] E[B~ q. By induction hypothesis again, x: A, j:A I= u: C, and so 
u[wt[u/x]/x, u/JJ]E[[C~ q. But (using linearity) 
U[M’f [U/Xl/x, 5/j] = u[(ft)/x] [U/X, \V/,f, i?/j]. 
So r, ,f: A --d B, A + u [( ft)/.x] : C, as required. 
(2). 
(Contraction) 
r,x:!A,y:!At-t:B 
r, z:!A F let z be x(;iv in t:B 
Let y, U, tl be given with U, UE[[T, !A] q. By induction hypothesis, 
r, x:! A, y:! A I= t:B, so t[ii, u/x, u/y] U CE[B~ q. Applying the definition of the evalu- 
ation relation, we can conclude that let u be x(a:y in t[ti]Uc~[Bl q, as required. 
(3). 
(V’R) 
Ttt:A 
l-t t:V’a.A 
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By induction hypothesis, rl= t: A, i.e. 
Because r does not occur free in r, this is equivalent to 
i.e. to rI= t:Vsr.A. 0 
As a simple consequence of the realizability theorem, we have the following 
theorem. 
Theorem 5.3. System LF satisfies Convergence. 
Proof. Suppose that E t: A is derivable in system LF. We can apply (VR) freely here, 
so, without loss of generality, we can assume that A is closed. By the realizability 
theorem, + t:A, i.e. tc[A]. Write A as V?.B, where B does not have a quantifier 
outermost. If B=xi, then [A] =8, contradicting tE[A]. In any other case, the realiz- 
ability semantics of the outermost connective in B immediately implies that tu. 0 
6. Classical linear logic 
Intuitionistic linear logic is essentially a refinement of ordinary intuitionistic logic, 
and its computational interpretation is a refinement of the i,-calculus. The full system 
of linear logic, which for emphasis we refer to as classical linear logic (CLL), represents 
a much more radical departure from the tradition of constructive logic, and its 
computational interpretation requires a corresponding departure from the functional 
framework. 
The basic step in the extension from intuitionistic to classical linear logic is the 
introduction of the linear negation A ‘. The idea is that this will obey the same kind of 
laws as classical negation, while constructive content is retained through linearity. 
This requires the introduction of a number of new connectives, as duals to the existing 
ones: -L as dual to 1, ‘B (“par”) as dual to 0, ? (“why not”) as dual to !, and 3 as dual to 
V. (The two additive constructs & and @ will be dual to each other in CLL.) Linear 
negation is then characterized by the following laws: 
(A @ B)l= A’ P.B’ 
(18) 
28 
(!A)‘=?A- 
(kkA)‘=3c(.AL 
A-‘lB=A1’BB. 
The syntax of linear formulas in CLL is then defined as follows. Formulas are built 
from propositional variables a, p, ;’ and their linear negations X-, /j’, ‘I” by the 
following connectives and quantifiers: 
Units I I 
Multiplicatives @ -5’ 
Additives & 0 
Exponentials ! ? 
Quantifiers v 3. 
Linear negation is definifiorzull~ extended to general formulas by the equations (18), 
while linear implication is treated as a derived operator, defined by the last equation 
in (1X). 
The proof system for CLL is a fully symmetric sequent calculus, in which sequents 
have the form 
with the intended meaning that the formula @ f -.. P A is valid. However, a consider- 
able economy is gained by observing that a sequent r t- A is equivalent, by (1 S), to the 
sequent k I”, 3; so it is sufficient to consider right-sided sequents only. The sequent 
calculus presentation of CLL can then be given as follows: 
Axiom -__ 
t- r, A, B, A 
cut 
I-f,A tA,A’ 
t-AAL,A 
Exchange --- 
k l-, B, A, A t- 1-, A 
Unit K Perp &$ 
Times 
t-r,A kA,B 
Par 
t r, A, B 
FI-,A,A@B FI-, APB 
With flk: AL:!f Plus (i) 
t l-. A 
W,A@B 
Plus (ii) 
t r, B 
t-r,A@B 
b I., A 
Dereliction ~ 
kr,?A 
t- ? I‘, A 
Of Course __-- 
F?l-, !A 
Weakening &$!A 
t i-, ?A, ?A 
Contraction --Km 
I- r, A 
All -~ 
kf,V%.A 
(*I Exists 
tT, A[B,‘z] 
t- I-, 3%. A 
Note that these rules can be obtained from the rules of ILL by using the equations 
(18) and shifting the premises to the right of the turnstile. For example, both (&R) and 
(0 L) translate into instances of the With rule, while ((-7 R) translates into the Par 
rule, and (- L) into the Times rule. In particular, this shows that ILL can be 
interpreted as a subsystem of CLL; and hence that intuitionistic logic can be inter- 
preted in CLL. 
The question now arises as to how to give a computational interpretation for CLL, 
which is not merely an extension of ILL, but embodies a radical change of perspective: 
the asymmetry between inputs and outputs has been abolished, apparently by formal 
fiat. But what does this actually man in computational terms? 
To sharpen our ideas, let us focus on the Cut rule. In ILL, this appears as: 
while in CLL one has: 
t I-, A 
There is an important formal difference between these two versions of the Cut rule. 
The intuitionistic version is asymmetri.c; the left premise is distinguished from the right 
by the fact that the cut formula appears in the output position (i.e. as a conclusion) in 
one, and in input position (i.e. as a premise) in the other. This is reflected on the 
programming level by the fact that Cut is interpreted in system LF by the noncom- 
mutative operation offknction composition (expressed syntactically as substitution). 
By contrast, the Cut rule in CLL is fully symmetric; in CLL we have the equulity 
II” = A, so we could equally well write 
(By the Exchange rule, the different order of the formulas in the resulting sequent is 
not significant.) So on the programming level, we should expect to interpret the CLL 
Cut rule by a commutatice operation. At this point it becomes very natural to invoke 
concurrency theory, as offering just the kind of generalization we need. As Milner has 
emphasized throughout his work on concurrency [32,34], communicating processes 
can be thought of as a generalization of functions, while the key operation of parullel 
composition is a commutative operation which generalizes function application or 
composition. So we may attempt to replace expression evaluation by concurrent 
process execution as the underlying computational paradigm, and to interpret Cut by 
a suitable form of parallel composition. Of course, these ideas are entirely in line with 
Girard’s emphatic hints that classical linear logic opens the way to a logical view of 
parallel computation [ 12, 141. 
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We shall now present a computational interpretation of CLL which seeks to 
embody these ideas in a simple and elegant form, in the general framework we have 
established in the preceding sections. Thus, we will define a syntax for proqf expres- 
sions, and give an assignment of proof expressions to sequent proofs in CLL, and an 
operational semantics for proof expressions. 
6. I. Syntux of procf expressions 
Firstly, a point of terminology: we shall use list to mean finite sequence. We define 
a number of syntactic categories: 
- - _ 
l A set _ 1” of names, ranged over by x, y, z. We use x, J-, z to range over lists of names. 
l Terms have one of the forms 
X 
* 0 
fOZ.4 tPu 
inl(t) inr(u) X(PO Q) 
?t t@ u X(P) 
where t, u are terms, and P, Q are proof expressions. 
l Coequations have the form t _L u, where t, u are terms. We use 0, E to range over 
lists of coequations. 
l Proof‘expressions have the form 0; t, where 0 is a list of coequations, and F is a list 
of terms. We use P, Q to range over proof expressions. 
Notation. The occurrences of .x1, . . . , xk in a term of the form x1, . . . , xk(P[l Q) or 
x1, . ..) xk(P) are said to be passbe; all other occurrences are active. If e is some 
syntactic expression (term, coequation, proof expression, etc.), we write ~ +‘(e) for the 
set of names occurring in e, and A, $“(e) (PC 1 ‘(e)) for the set of names occurring 
actively (passively) in e. 
We shall now define an assignment of proof expressions to sequent proofs in CLL. 
The idea is that, to each proof IT of a sequent t- Al, . . . , Ak, we will assign a proof 
expression 0; tl, , fk, where 0 corresponds to the uses of the Cut rule in Il. 
To ensure that suitable linearity constraints are satisfied, we shall adopt the 
following name convention (cf. the variable convention in [3]): dzferent names are 
introduced for each instance of the Axiom, With and Of Course rules. 
Proof expression assignment for CLL 
Axiom Exchange 
t- 0; 1-, t:A,u:B, A 
k; x:A’, x:A k 0; r, u:B, t:A, A 
tO;r,t:A kZ;A,u:A’ 
cut - 
t 0, 8, t I u;T, A 
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Unit ~ Perp 
t- 0;r 
t-;*:l l-0;r, @:I 
Times 
t e;r, t:A t E;A, u:B 
Par 
F 0; 1-, t: A, u:B 
F 0, E; r, A, t @ u:A 0 B F O;l-, t3’u:APB 
With 
t o;i:r, t:A t E;ii:r, u:B 
F; .u:T, X(O;t, t [Z;U, u):A&B 
Plus (i) 
t- o;r, t:A 
Plus (ii) 
F o;r, u:B 
F O;r, inl(t):A 0 B I- O;r, inr(u):A 0 B 
Dereliction 
k- O;l-,t:A 
Weakening 
t o;r 
b- O;r,?t:?A t-@$_:?A 
Contraction 
t O;l-, t:?A, u:?A 
t o;r, t (d u:?A 
Of Course 
t o;cr, t:A 
t-;x:?T, X(O;f, t):! A 
All 
t o;r, t:A 
(*) Exists 
t O;l-, t:A[B/a] 
t o;r, t:V’z.A t o;r, t:h.A 
6.2. Operational semantics: the linear CHAM 
We now complete our computational interpretation of classical linear logic by 
giving an operational semantics for proof expressions. Rather than directly defining 
the relation of evaluation to canonical form, we shall define a one-step transition 
relation on proof expressions, and define canonical forms as certain norma/,forms with 
respect to this relation. This is because the notion of computation for proof expres- 
sions is inherently parallel; the model is that the coequations form a pool of concur- 
rent processes. In fact, our presentation of the operational semantics fits very nicely 
into the framework of the chemical abstract machine proposed recently by Berry and 
Boudol [S] as a paradigm for concurrent abstract machines. They describe the basic 
ideas thus: 
Most available concurrency models are based on architectural concepts, e.g. 
networks of processes communicating by means of ports or channels. Such concepts 
convey a rigid geometrical vision of concurrency. Our chemical abstract machine 
model is based on a radically different paradigm . where the concurrent compon- 
ents are freely “moving” in the system and communicate when they come into 
contact. . 
Intuitively, the state of a system is like a chemical solution in which floating 
molecules can interact with each other according to reaction rules; a magical 
mechanism stirs the solution, allowing for possible contacts between molecules ~ in 
chemistry, this is the result of Brownian motion, but we do not insist on any 
particular mechanism, this being an implementation matter. The solution trans- 
formation process is obviously truly parallel; any number of reactions can be 
performed in parallel, provided that they involve disjoint sets of molecules. 
The “molecules” of the linear CHAM are the coequations. We refer to 0 in O;tas the 
“solution”, and to las the “main body”. The idea is that the computation is done in the 
solution, with the result recorded in the main body. One can think of each coequation 
either as a single sequential process, or as a tightly coupled synchronous parallel 
composition of two processes, proceeding in lockstep. (So coequations could be 
modelled by “membranes” in Berry and Boudol’s terminology; but we shall not 
pursue this idea.) 
We distinguish between two kinds of rule for the CHAM (cf. [34]): structural rules, 
which describe the “magical mixing” of the solution; and reaction rules, which describe 
the actual computation steps. 
Structural rules 
There are two basic structural rules: 
0 tJ_u * u_Lt 
0 t I u, t’ I u’ % t’ I li’, t I u 
The first says that each coequation can be regarded as a multiset of exactly two 
terms, the second that lists of coequations can be regarded as multisets. 
These rules can be applied in any context: 
The basic metarule for the CHAM refers to the transition relation __f to be 
defined below. 
Magical mixing rule: 
P+“p’ P'---fQ' Q'+*Q 
P-Q 
We regard this as a metarule, since it is really part of the specification of the 
machine, rather than a description of an actual computation step. 
Notational interlude: mriants 
We shall need to consider variants of terms t occurring in a proof expression P, i.e. 
copies of t in which all names have been replaced by “fresh” names not already 
occurring in P. In order to implement this global condition in a local way, we need 
a little extra structure. We fix a bijection &t“z No x (1, r}*, and extend the name 
convention so that when a name .xH(x~, s) is introduced in a proof expression, the 
,x0 component is distinct from that of any name already occurring in the expression. 
Now given a term t, we define t’. t’ to be the result of replacing each occurrence of 
a name .x+-+(x0, s) in t by J~++(.x~, sl), z-(.x,,, sr), respectively. The idea is that the 
following invariant is established by the proof expression assignment and maintained 
by the transition relation to be defined below: 
For all distinct names .xH(.x,,, s), ytr (JJ~, t) occurring in P, xO=yo implies that 
s is incompatible with t (i.e. they have no upper bound in the prefix ordering). 
Reaction rules 
These rules describe how lists of adjacent coequations react, giving rise to new lists. 
Notation. Given X=.x1, . , .yk, t= tI , . . . , tkr we write XI I to denote the list 
xr 1 tr, , xk ,_ tk. 
Communication: 
t_Lx,.ulu - tlu 
Unit: 
t @ u I t’Pu’ - t I t’, u I u’ 
Case Left: 
X(O;t, t [IE;U, u) I inl(c) __f 0, x I t, t J_ u 
Case Right: 
X(O;i, t) l?u - 0, x I i, t I_ u 
Discard: 
X(P)I- d x1 ,__, . , .xk I_ 
copy: 
X(P) _L u (8 u -+ x I (2 (a; X’), W(P)’ I u, X(P )* i 2’ 
The reaction rules contribute to the global transition relation on proof expressions 
via the following metarule: 
Reaction context rule: 
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Cleanup rule 
Finally, we have a rule which tidies up a computation by consolidating information 
back into the main body i of a proof expression O;t. This is somewhat analogous to 
collecting the answer substitution from a PROLOG computation. 
Cleanup: 
x I t, O;t ---f @;i[r/x] (xcA,Y‘(t)). 
We can now define the result of a computation. A proof expression P= 0; i is 
canonical if it is a +-normal form, and each coequation in 0 has the form x I t or 
t I x for some name x. P is cut-@ee if 0 is empty. 
def 
PUQ o P-w* Q, Q canonical 
6.3. Discussion 
Firstly, we consider the computational intuitions behind these rules. The key rule is 
Communication, which is the only one which involves interaction between coequa- 
tions. In ILL, as in i-calculus, variables are place-holders for substitution. In CLL, the 
two occurrences of a name can be thought of as the two ends of a channel; the 
Communication rule uses this channel to connect two processes (terms) together. 
Linearity amounts to the restriction that channels are used only once. 
From the computational aspect, the most interesting rules are those for the 
additives and exponentials. In both cases we have lazy types - & and !-which in the 
concurrent framework must be implemented by some form of explicit synchronization. 
This is the role of the forms X(P 0 Q) and -W(P). In both cases, proof expressions are 
suspended from execution, and only resumed when sufficient information is available 
(or, in more computational terms, when sufficient demand has been generated). In the 
case of the additives, the With rule (which under the classical dualities is equivalent to 
the intuitionistic rule (@L)) corresponds to a case statement, i.e. a choice between two 
alternatives. Clearly, we only want to evaluate that expression corresponding to the 
alternative actually chosen; so we must wait until the choice is made. This is done 
when the term X(P[ Q) is cut against a term denoting a proof of the dual 
(A&B)l =A’ 0 B’, of the form inl(t), where t is a proof of A’, or inr(u), where u is 
a proof of B’; hence the Case Left and Case Right rules. So we must defer any 
evaluation of the proofs of the side formulas r of the With rule until this choice is 
made. (Indeed, we don’t even know till then whether these proofs should be taken as 
tar U.) This is accomplished by replacing the proof terms by the names X. These can in 
turn be embedded in complex proof terms and cut against other terms. However, 
when one of these names “rises to the surface” in a coequation Xi -L w, the computation 
with that coequation will not be able to proceed until the choice associated 
with the With rule which generated the name Xi is resolved, by the application 
of a Case Left or Case Right rule. Suppose the Case Left rule is applied. At that 
point, the coequation xi I ti is released into the solution, and by the Communication 
rule, this can “bond” with xi 112: to form the coequation ti J_ ~1, which can now 
proceed. 
Similar considerations apply to the rules for the exponentials. The idea here is that 
the term of type ?AL specifies how many copies of the term of type !A are required; 
each of the terms for the side formulas ?I- of the Of Course rule which generated the 
!A term Z(P) must then be directed to ask for a corresponding multiple of copies from 
its “input”. 
From the logical side, the reaction rules correspond exuctly to the key steps in Cut 
Elimination, or more precisely of evaluation to canonical form. This is spelled out in 
detail in the proof of the realizability theorem (Theorem 7.17), and the reader is 
strongly encouraged to work out some of the transitions described there in detail. So 
each rule has a clear logical content. 
Finally, some brief remarks about the relationship between our proof-expressions 
and Girard’s proof nets [ 121. (A detailed comparison must be left to future work.) 
Roughly speaking, proof expressions correspond to proof nets, the lazy forms 
.q(Po Q) and X(P) to proof boxes, and the reaction rules to the symmetric contrac- 
tions, as described in [12]. A more precise comparison would require some care; for 
example, the use of channels for both axiom contraction and the synchronization 
associated with the lazy types in our calculus does not appear in the proof net 
formalism. The author’s impression is that both representations have their merits and 
uses: 
l Proof nets are visually appealing and support geometric insights into the structure 
of proofs. They work very well for the multiplicative fragment, but the use of boxes 
is cumbersome and negates many of their advantages. 
l Proof expressions are an efficient syntactic vehicle for making precise definitions 
and carrying out detailed proofs; and also as a linear notation for writing down 
linear proofs! 
The reader must be left to form his or her own opinion of the relative merits of proof 
expressions vs. proof nets as a syntactic medium, and, more importantly, whether we 
have succeeded in making the computational reading of linear logic, and particularly 
the connections with concurrent computation, more substantial and convincing. (A 
full evaluation should include the material to be presented in Sections 7 and 8.) We 
will briefly indicate a significant difference in the present approach as compared to 
Girard’s, that should not be overlooked. This is that, in keeping with the general 
philosophy on operational semantics set out in Section 2, our operational semantics is 
based on evaluation to canonicalform rather than normal jbrm. We feel that this choice 
is amply justified by the general arguments given in Section 2, the evidence of our 
definitions in this section, and the detailed results in Section 7. To recapitulate: 
l Our operational definitions are much more compact, elegant, and memorable than 
the calculus presented in [12]. 
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l They correspond much better to what would actually be done in an implementa- 
tion. (See Section 8.) 
l There are considerable technical beneifits, the main one being that Determinacy is 
preserved. See Theorem 7.9 and Lemma 7.10. At the same time, not too much is 
lost: see Theorem 7.20. (Also, our realizability interpretation of the linear types is 
essentially the same as Girard’s, yet our computation rules suffice to prove the 
realizability theorem (Theorem 7.17).) 
7. Basic theory of PE2 
We name the formal system of second-order propositional CLL with its assignment 
of proof expressions PE2, by analogy with Girard’s PN2. We shall now study the basic 
properties of this system. 
Notation. We write PE2 t- O;t:T if the sequent t-@;t:T is derivable in PE,. 
Firstly, we consider two important structural conditions on proof expressions. 
1. Linearity. A proof expression P is linear if 
l each name occurring in P does so exactly twice, and 
l for each term -f(Q) or ?c(Q 0 R) occurring in P, the proof expressions Q, R are linear. 
2. Acyclicity. Given a proof expression P, we define a graph Y(P) with two types of 
arc as follows: 
l The nodes of Y(P) are the set of all occurrences of terms t in P. (We will blur the 
distinction between terms and their occurrences in our notation, but the reader 
should be aware of it.) 
l There is an arc t-u iff one of the following conditions holds: 
~ t I u or u I t occurs in P. 
~~ t @ u or u @ t occurs in P. 
~ For some ~1, VV, X, 2’ (t I u or L’ I t) and (u I pi or u’ I U) occur in P, XE_~“(U), 
ye-l”(w), and x, J’ occur in X for some i(Q) occurring in P. 
l There is an arc t-u iff t, u are disjoint occurrences, and Uli’(t)n,V(u)#@ 
A cq~cle in Y(P) is a sequence 
t,_u, “’ -t!X-4L-t, (k> I), 
in which no occurrence is repeated other than tI. 
A proof expression P is ac~lclic if Y(P) has no cycles. 
Acyclicity can be understood as the appropriate hereditary condition to ensure that 
self-loops x Ix can never appear in a typable proof expression as we apply 
transitions. We can read t-u as “t should be disjoint from u”, and t-u as “t is 
connected to ~1”. Then acyclicity precludes the “contradictory” situation in which 
nodes that should be disjoint are connected. 
Proposition 7.1. If PE2 t @;?I‘, then O;f is linear and acyclic. 
Proof. By induction on derivations in PE,. Linearity is immediate from the form of 
the rules and the name convention. For acyclicity, we consider the case for the Cut 
rule: 
t O;i:l-, t: A t E;ii:A, u: Al- 
t- 0, 2, t I u;I:r, ii: A 
By the name convention, 1 ‘(O;t, t)nL 1 “(E;U, IL)=@, so there is no --link between 
these two proof expressions. Hence, any cycle in Y(O, 8, t l_ u;t, U) must in fact lie 
either in %(O;t, t) or in C%(E;U, u), contrary to hypothesis. Cl 
Proposition 7.2. Suppose P d Q. !f‘P is linrar and acyclic, so is Q. 
Proof. Firstly, we show that linearity is preserved, by cases on the rule used to derive 
P-‘Q. 
Unit, Pair: trivial. 
Communication: t I x, x J_ 11 d t I u. The net effect is to delete both occurrences 
of x. 
Cleanup: t I .x, O;f- O;f[t/x], where XEA. t”(r). Since P is linear, the net effect 
is to delete both occurrences of s. 
Case Left: i(R 0 S) I inl(c)d 0, X I f, t I c, where R = O;t, t. By definition of 
linearity, P linear implies R, S linear. Thus, every name occurring in S had both its 
occurrences there; so the net effect of this trasition is to delete all occurrences of “1 ‘(S). 
Case Right: symmetrical to Case Left. 
Read: trivial, since this transition has no effect on the number of name occurrences. 
Discard: .2(R) L---t .Y L, ,_. Similarly to Case Left, since R is linear the effect 
is to delete all occurrences of I 1 ‘(R). 
Copy: Y(R) I t(a u- X I (.?{a 2’). Y(R)’ I t, Y(R)’ _L u. Since R was linear, and 
(.)I, (.)’ rename outside P, the net effect is to delete / 1 ‘(R), and to add two copies of xl, x” 
for each .XE~ 1 ‘(R)uf. Furthermore, R’, R’ will be linear, since R was. 
Now we show that acylicity is preserved; this will require the assumption that P is 
linear. The general technique is to show that any cycle in Q can be transformed into 
one in P, contradicting the assumption that P is acyclic. We argue again by cases on 
how P -Q was derived. 
Cleanup: t I x, O;t-- @;f[t/.x]. Any path 
-t_... 
in Q can be transformed into 
-t_x-x;~~ 
in P. 
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Communication: t I x, x -L u __f t _L u. A cycle in Q can be transformed into one in 
P by replacing any subpath 
‘-t-L,-... 
~-t._.Y-x_u-~~~. 
Unit: trivial. 
Pair: f 0 u I t’vu’ - t .L t’, u I u’. Consider e.g. a link 
. -‘r_r’“.., 
in a putative cycle in Q. If u-t or t’- u’ then we can replace this link by 
. -t_11-... 
In any other case, we can replace it by 
,.. -t 0 u_t”8u’-... 
Case Left: Z(K OS) I inl(o)- 0, X I t, t I u, where R = O;?, t. Since R is linear by 
assumption, I 1 ‘(R) is disjoint from the remainder of P. So there can be no cycle 
containing links Xi_ ti or t, U; and any cycle containing a link in R must lie entirely in 
R. But then any cycle in Q must have already occurred in P. 
Case Right, Read: similar to Case Left. 
Discard: trivial. 
Copy: i(R) I t (a u+ X I (.?‘@I.?), T(R)’ I t, T(R)’ I u. Arguing as in the proof of 
linearity, we know that R’ is linear, and ,t ‘(R’) is disjoint from the rest of Q. Hence any 
cycle in Q containing a node in R’ must lie wholly within R’; but this would imply 
a cycle in R and hence in P, contrary to hypothesis. Similarly for R’. Thus, if we had 
a cycle in Q, by replacing any subpaths 
. ..-x ,_(xf(u;xl)-~(R)‘_t-... 
or 
by 
. ..-.y. ,_(.uf(n:x~)-x(R)l_u-..’ 
. ..-f(R)_t(?u’-... 
we would obtain a cycle in P, contrary to hypothesis. The only case in which this 
cannot be done, because t”u, yields 
-0. ,_M)i-iXi_ (x;(i x7)-x(R)‘_t-u _~(R)'-(xS~~.XS)_X~-W~_C~~... 
But then we can replace this by 
. - 1.; z,cj-... 
since Ui_L’j in 9(P). C 
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For the remainder of this section, we will assume that all proof expressions under 
consideration are linear and acyclic. 
7. I. Determinac> 
We now prove a suitable version of Determinacy for PE,. To state this properly, we 
need a definition. 
Definition 7.3. A renaming is a permutation p : ~_I’ g -1.. This is extended to a substitu- 
tion on terms, coequations, proof expressions, etc., in the usual way. Now we define 
structural equivalence of proof expressions: 
def 
PEQ - 3p.(p(P) e*Q). 
Structural equivalence merely factors out irrelevant syntactic detail, similarly to 
a-equivalence in the i-calculus [3]. 
We can now state the appropriate form of Determinacy: 
Determinacy: PUQ& PUR * Q=R. 
The remainder of this subsection is devoted to proving this property. 
Firstly, it will be convenient to decompose the transition relation -+. We define 
P+,Q iff P- Q can be derived using the Reaction rules, and P----t, Q iff 
P----t Q can be derived using the Cleanup rule. Clearly ----) = -+ru bc. 
Proposition 7.4. If P--+, Q and Pd, R, then either Qe* R, or jbr some S, 
Q ---+,S and R-,S. 
Proof. The only critical pair for _I arises from the Communication rule. Acyclicity 
precludes the situation x _L y, x I y. The only remaining possibility is 
tlu 
Proposition 7.5. If P -C Q and P---t, R, then either Q = R, or for some S, Q -+C S 
and R -< s. 
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Proof. The only case for a critical pair is 
Proposition 7.6. !f P-I? Q und P-, R, tken,for some S, Q-c S and Rd,S. 
Proof. By linearity, the only case for a critical pair is 
Proposition 7.7. If P ---+c Q ---+r R, then fbr some S, PI,. S bc R. 
Proof. If P=.u I t, O;i-, O;I[t/x] -,Z;F[t/.u], then 
P lr x I t, z; I-+, 3; t [t/x]. -.. 
By standard arguments 131, Propositions 7.4-7.7 imply the corresponding proper- 
ties for -:,-;. 
Now we show that -* is confluent up to structural equivalence. 
Theorem 7.8. If P +* P’ and P---•,* P”, then .for some Q’= Q”, P’-* Q’ and 
P” .* Q”. 
Proof. Consider the following diagram: 
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Firstly, by Proposition 7.7, P- *P’ can be written as P-,*-: P’, and 
similarly for P -* P”. Next, (1) can be filled in up to +* by Proposition 7.4; then (2) 
and (3) can be filled in by Proposition 7.6; and finally (4) can be filled in up to = by 
Proposition 7.5. 0 
As an immediate corollary to confluence, we have the following theorem. 
Theorem 7.9 (Determinacy). Pl,l Q & PIJ R + Q = R 
7.2. Conaergence 
Our aim in this subsection is to prove: 
Convergence: PE, k O;f:T * llQ.(O;IUQ). 
In fact, we shall prove a stronger result: every typable proof expression P is 
canonically strongly norinaliziny (notation: CSN(P)), i.e. every transition sequence 
P+P1-Pz+‘.. 
ends in a canonical form. 
Firstly, we will prove a very useful lemma, which will play a role in our work 
analogous to Girard’s use of the standardization theorem in [12]. 
Lemma 7.10. P-* Q&CSN(Q) + CSN(P). 
Proof. We begin by making a number of reductions of what is to be proved. Firstly, it 
clearly suffices to prove 
P-Q&CSN(Q) * CSN(P) 
since the general case follows immediately 
prove 
by induction. Next, note that it suffices to 
P-Q&SN(Q) * SN(P) (19) 
Indeed, suppose (19) holds, P----, Q 
sequence from P ends in a normal form; by 
the (any) canonical form that Q evaluates 
Finally, it suffices to prove that 
and CSN(Q). By (19), every transition 
Determinacy, this is the same (up to -) as 
to. 
P-Q&W(Q) * SW’) (20) 
where SN,(P) means that every -,-sequence starting from P ends in a I~- 
normal form. In fact, SN(P) o SN,(P). To see this, suppose for a contradiction that 
SN,(P), and there is an infinite sequence 
(21) 
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If there were infinitely many -,-steps in the sequence, then by Proposition 7.7 we 
could construct an infinite +,-sequence from P, contradicting SN,(P). So there are 
only finitely many +,-steps in (21), hence there is an infinite -,-sequence from 
some P,. But this is impossible, as wc is obviously strongly normalizing. 
Finally, we prove (20). Suppose that P- Q1, and that there is an infinite sequence 
P+,P,-,PZ-r.... 
Using Propositions 7.4 and 7.6, we can proceed as in the following diagram: 
P d PI - P2 - ... 
I 
I’ . r r 
Q1 . > lz . . . ..> ;, . . . . . . . . . 
r r r 
Either this diagram can be extended indefinitely, or Qn%* P, for some II. In 
either case, there is an infinite -,-sequence from Q. So SN,(Q) 3 SN,(P), as 
required. 0 
def 
If we define Pl,l o 3Q. (PUQ), then as an immediate corollary of this Lemma we 
have the following proposition. 
Proposition 7.11. Pl,l e CSN(P). 
Itl’,,the light of this proposition, we write P/j rather than CSN(P). Also, we define 
Pljo1 (PU). 
We now proceed with the proof of Convergence, following much the same lines as 
Girard’s proof of strong normalization for PN2 in [12], but in the style of Section 5, 
and with some significant modifications dictated by the differences in our framework. 
Firstly, some notation. Given proof expressions 
P=O;i, t, Q= E; ii, u 
we define 
Cut(P, Q)= 0, 3, t I u;t, tl. 
More precisely, we choose P’E P, Q’= Q such that ..+^(P')n A'*(Q')=@, and form 
Cut(P’, Q’) (compare the definition of substitution in [3]); we will generally take this 
renaming for granted, and not refer to it explicitly. Note that Cut(P, Q) is defined only 
for proof expressions with nonempty main body; shortly, we will take steps to excise 
this minor nuisance. 
Now we define 
def 
PI Q o Cut(P, Q)J 
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(This definition is easily seen to be independent of the choice of P’, Q’.) Let PIE be the 
set of linear, acyclic proof expressions with nonempty main body. Given Us $(E, we 
can define 
Now by standard fact about Galois connections [7], we have the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 7.12. (i) The operutor (.) li is monotone, injationary and idempotent. 
(ii) U”‘= U’. 
(iii) V’PE$E, Ug$E(PI U 0 PIU”). 
A semantic type is a subset U i PiE satisfying: 
l U#@ 
0 UJ i.e. VPGU.(PU) 
l u=uLL. 
We write &! for the set of all semantic types, 
Lemma 7.13. Cut(P, Q)l,l * PlJ&QU. 
Proof. Suppose Pfi. There are two possibilities: 
(1) 1 SN(P). By Lemma 7.10, this implies 1 SN,(P); but then 1 SN,(Cut(P, Q)), 
and so Cut(P, Q)J’/. 
(2) P has a noncanonical normal form. This means that P-F t I u, O;f, where 
neither t nor u are names, and no reaction rule is applicable to t I u. But then 
Cut(P, Q) -,* t I u, E;ti, and any normal form derivable from this expression will 
still contain the co-equation t I u, and hence be noncanonical. 
The case when Qfi is entirely similar. 0 
Lemma 7.14. For all U G PIE: 
(i) U#8 3 U’U, 
(ii) Ulj = U’#@ 
Proof. (i) If PEU, QEU’, then Cut(P, Q)U, so by Lemma 7.13, PU. 
(ii) If U 1, then ;x, XE U-. To see this, suppose PcU. Then Cut(P, ;x, x)-’ P, and 
Plj, so by Lemma 7.10, Cut(P,;.x, x)u as required. 0 
Proposition 7.15. [f U & PE satisfies U #fl and U IJ, then U ‘E%. 
Proof. By Lemma 7.14 and Proposition 7.12(ii). 0 
We will now give a realizability interpretation of the linear types as elements of @. 
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Firstly, we define some operations on proof expressions, corresponding to the 
logical rules of PE,: 
Id,y=;x, x 
Unit=;* 
Perp(O;l) = O;t, 0 
Par(O;i, t, u)=O;t, t’B II 
Times(O;t, t, Z;U, u)= 0, Z;t, ii, t 0 u 
With,(P, Q)= X(P 0 Q) 
Plusl(O;t, t)=@;t, inl(t) 
Plusr(O;f, t)= O;f, inr(t) 
Of Course,(P) = X(P) 
Der(O;t, t)=@;t, ?t 
Weak(O;T)= O;i, 
Con(O;t, t, u)=O;t, t@tr 
The same provisos about renaming which we made for the Cut construct apply to 
all these operations; this ensures that, except for the Cut, none of these operations 
create any communication between their arguments. It easily follows that all of the 
above operations F(P1,. . . , P,) satisfy: 
Pilj&...&P,l,l * F(P,,...,P,)jj. 
In a sense, the whole purpose of the realizability semantics is to formulate a suffi- 
ciently strong “inductive hypothesis” to allow us to extend this to the Cut. 
Now we define: 
UPV=\‘T~~~~~(P,Q)JPEU~,QEV’)~ 
U&V=(~PIUSI(P)~PEU’)~(PI~~~(Q)~QEV’})~ 
?U={Of Course(P)1 PEU~}’ 
and for F : 4+# 
tf(F)=( u (F(U)- ( uE&)y. 
By Propositions 7.15 and 7.12 and the remarks immediately preceding these 
definitions, they do yield semantic types. 
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The remaining connectives are defined by duality, so as to force the equations (18) 
to be satisfied: 
l=l.l 
ug V=(U1’BVl)l 
u @ V=(UI& Vl)l 
!u=(?uly 
3(F)=v(xJ.F(U)1)1 
These definitions induce a semantic function 
1.4 : TExp+TEnv++Y 
where TExp is the set of linear type expressions, i.e. formulae of CLL, and 
TEnv=TVar-+‘)/ is the set of type environments, ranged over by r]. 
Lemma 7.16. For all .4~TExp, qETEnv: 
(lI-44VY=uA’nV. 
Proof. Immediate from the fact that the realizability interpretation of the linear 
connectives satisfies (18). 0 
We can now give a realizability interpretation of PE2 sequents. Firstly, given 
P=O;t,f, Q=Z;ii,u we define 
P~Q=0,3,t_Lu;t,ii 
(with the standard proviso about renaming to ensure ..1 ‘(P) disjoint from -1 ‘(Q)); and 
write PQ, ...Qk to abbreviate (...(P.Q1)....Qk). 
Now we define 
def 
where P=O;F, T=A,, . . . ,A~,~T~I~~=~IA:IIYI,...,~A:II~. 
As a final preliminary, we define the shif operator on PIE: 
a(O;t, f)=O;i, t. 
Clearly, a(P)1 o P/j. More generally, if 7~ is a permutation on 
O;t,,, . . . . tnJ”l 0 O;tl)..., fklj. 
Note the following relationship: 
Cut(a(P), Q) = P Q. 
{l,...,k }, then 
We can now prove the basic result on the realizability interpretation. 
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Theorem 7.17 (Realizability). PE2 F O;i:T 3 /= O;t:r. 
Proof. By induction on derivations in PE2. 
(1) Axiom: 
k;.x:AL, .x:A 
Fix VeTEnv, P~[A”]q=([A~ljv)‘, QE[A’I;~. We must show that Id,PQlJ. But 
Id, PQ - Cut(P, Q), and Cut(P, Q)lj, since P _L Q by assumption. Hence by Lemma 
7.10, Id, PQlj. 
(2) Exchange: Immediate from the remarks about permutations preceding the 
theorem. 
(3) cut: 
F 0, z-, t I u;i:r, u:Ll 
Let P=O;t,t, Q= Z;U, u, and fix r/ETEnv, PG[[T’]~, Q~[d’]q. We must show 
that Cut(P, Q)PQU. By induction hypothesis, for all RE[A’]~, PERU, and for 
all SE[A]~,QQSIJ. H ence o(PP)@ [A’] a)‘= [A] y, and a(QQ)@[A] q)‘, so 
Cut(a(PP), a(QQ))U. But Cut(o(PP), o(QQ))+* Cut(P, Q)PQ, so Cut(P, Q)PQlJ. 
(4) Perp: 
Let P=O;f and fix VETEnv, Qc[r’]q. We must show that for all Qs[IJ_‘] q, 
Perp(P)Q&,I, i.e. that a(Perp(P)Q) I {Unit}“. By Proposition 7.12(iii), it suffices to 
show that a(Perp(P)Q) I {Unit>, i.e. that Perp(P)Q Unitu. But Perp(P)Q Unit- 
PO, and by induction hypothesis Pou, so by Lemma 7.10, Perp(P)QQU. 
(5) Unit: 
t;*:1 
We must show that for all q, PE[l’]v, Unit Plj. By Proposition 7.12(i), (.)‘I is 
inflationary, so UnitE[lljy, and Unit P=Cut(Unit, P)lJ. 
(6) Par: 
t e;t:r, t:~, U:B 
t- O;I:r, tPu:APB 
Let P=O;f, t, u, and fix VETEnv, QE[[r-] 9. We must show that for all 
QE[(AFB)‘] q, Par(P)QQ U, i.e. that o(Par(P)Q) I [(APB)‘] q. Applying Proposi- 
tion 7.12(iii) to the definition of [(A TB)‘] y, we see that it is sufficient to consider Q of 
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the form Times(R, S), where RE[A’] y, SERB’] v]. But Par(P)0 Times(R, S) - PQRS, 
and by the induction hypothesis PQRSU, so by Lemma 7.10, Par(P)0 Times(R, S)u. 
(7) Times: 
k- O;t:P, t:A t- E;ti:A, u:B 
to , F;f:l-, U:A, t @ u:A @ B 
Let P=O;t, t, Q=E; ii, u, and fix TlETEnv, P~[r’j q, QE[[A’] ye. We must show 
that for all RE[(A 0 B)‘] y, Times(P, Q)PQRU. By induction hypothesis, for all 
SE[A’]q, PPSlJ,and for all TE[B’]~, QQTU. Hence a(PP)E([IA’IIr?)‘=[Aljy,and 
a(QQ)E([Bl] q)‘. Applying Proposition 7.12(i) (specifically, the fact that (.)” is 
inflationary) to the definition of [(A&B)‘] ye, we see that 
Times(a(PP), o(QQ)&( [AI&B’] q)‘, 
and hence that Cut(Times(o(PP), o(QQ)), R)U. But 
Cut(Times(o(PP), a(QQ)), R) U %* Times(P, Q)p@R, 
so Times(P, Q)pGR lj. 
(8) With: 
k-@o;t:r,t.A FH;ti:l-,u:B 
F;X:T, X(P[ Q):A&B 
where P=O;i, t, Q= F-;U, u. Fix r/ETEnv, Pe[P’]q. We must show that for all 
RE[(A&B)lI] q, With(P, Q)PRU. Reasoning as in the case for Par, it suffices to 
consider Q of the form either PlusI( %[A’] q, or Plusr(T), TE[B’] y. In the first 
case, With(P, Q)P PlusI -* Pl??, and by induction hypothesis Pl%U, so by 
Lemma 7.10, With(P, Q)PR U. The second case is similar. 
(9) Plus Left: 
k e;t:r, t:A 
t O;t:r, inl(t):A @B 
Let P=O;i, t, and fix VETEnv, QE[[P’] ye. We must show that for all 
QE[(A 0 B)‘] q, Plusl(P)QQlJ. By induction hypothesis, for all RE[AL] q, PQRU, so 
dP&([Al II)‘, and 
Plusl(a(PQ))E([[A~&BIlj~)i=[A @Bnv, 
so Cut(Plusl(a(PQ)), Q)l,j. But 
Cut(Plusl(a(PQ)), Q)=* PIusl(P)QQ, 
so PIusl(P)QQlj. 
(10) Plus Right: Similar to Plus Left. 
(11) Dereliction: 
E o;t:r, t:A 
t- 0.f.r ?r:?A >. >. 
48 S. 
Let P= O;i, t, and fix r/ETEnv, QE[[P~] q. We must show that for all QE[(?A)‘J q, 
Der(P)QQ lj . Reasoning as in the case for Par, it suffices to consider Q of the form 
OfCourse( R~1.4’1 q. But Der(P)Q OfCourse -* PQR, and by the induc- 
tion hypothesis PQR u. Hence by Lemma 7.10, Der(P)QQU. 
(12) Contraction: 
t- O;t:r, t:?A, u:?B 
+ O;t:l-, t@ u:?A 
Let P= O;f, t, and fix VtiTEnv, QE[~~] q. We must show that for all Qe[(?A)‘] ye, 
Con(P)QQ 1. Reasoning as in the case for Par, it suffices to consider Q of the form 
OfCourse( RE[A’] q. But Con(P)Q OfCourse -* Con,(PQRR), where 
Con,(E;ti, rl, . , ck, wl, . . . , wk)=Z;U, u1 (4 wl, , ~(4 wk. 
(Recall the stipulations on renaming in the definition of P. Q.) Now 
Con,(PQRR) U o PQRR IJ, 
but by induction hypothesis PQRRU, hence by Lemma 7.10, Con(P)QQU, 
(13) Weakening: 
Let P=O;f, and fix VETEnv, QE[[r’] q. We must show that for all Qs[(?A)‘j q, 
Weak(P)QQl,l. Once again, it suffices to consider Q of the form OfCourse( 
RE[A’] ‘1. But Weak(P)Q OfCourse -* Weakk(PQ), and Weakk(PQ)U o PQl,l. 
By induction hypothesis PQU, hence by Lemma 7.10, Weak(P)QQ 1. 
(14) Of Course: 
I- e;t:?r, t:A 
t o;x:?r, X(P):! A 
where P= O;f, t. Fix VETEnv, Qe[?r’] q. We must show that for all QE[(! A)‘] q, 
OfCourse (P)QQU. By induction hypothesis, for all RE[IA’]~, PQRIJ, hence 
o(PQ)@IA’TI vl)‘, so OfCourse(c(PQ))E( [?(A’)] v])‘, and Cut(OfCourse(a(PQ)), 
Q)l.l. We must show that this implies that OfCourse(P)QQl,l. 
Firstly, we claim that it is sufficient to prove that OfCourse(P)QQU for Q of the 
form 
OfCourse(R)=OfCourse(R,), . . . . OfCourse( 
To see this, define K’(O;t, t)=O;t, f, and note that 
OfCourse(P)QQ 1 
o Park~l(K1(OfCourse(P))Q)Timesk-‘(Q)lj 
o a(Par”-‘(K’(OfCourse(P))Q)) I Timeskp’(Q), 
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and that 
if and only if 
o(Park-‘(a-‘(OfCourse(P))Q)) I {Timesk-‘(OfCourse(~))~~~[~‘~~}, 
by Proposition 7.12(iii). 
Next, we will establish the desired relationship between Cut(Of- 
Course(a(PQ)), Q)U and OfCourse(P)QQU. At the corresponding point in his proof 
in [12], Girard is able to use the commutative conversions, under which we would 
have 
OfCourse(P)QQ .* Cut(OfCourse(o(PQ)), Q). 
As the commutative conversions are not part of our calculus, we need a more 
elaborate argument. We shall use a technique inspired by concurrency theory [33]. 
We say that a relation .JA G PIE’ is a simulatinn if it satisfies 
P.%‘Q&P---t R =s ZIP’, Q’.(R +* P’&Q++ Q’&P’.&‘Q’). 
We need to establish some notation. We can write 
OfCourse(P)QQ = 50, x I J(Q), X(P) 11’; I’, v 
Cut(OfCourse(a(PQ)), Q)=E,, F(R) I c; 2, C 
where 
Moreover, .1 ‘(E,,; 6. c) is disjoint from the names occurring in the remainder of 
these expressions. 
Now we define a relation .&’ by: P’.+?Q’ iff 
where k>O, {SI, .” 1 .%J is a pairwise incompatible subset of 
I/, Y}“, J?“’ , . , JlkgA. 1 ‘(a), and l’(E)u uFE1 ,f ‘(vi)u.k’(i?) is disjoint from the 
names occurring in the remainder of these expressions. Taking k= 1, s, =E, v1 =v, 
“-7 ---0, %=Y, we have OfCourse(P)QQ& Cut(OfCourse(a(PQ)), Q). We claim that 
& is a simulation. To prove this, suppose P”d?Q”, and consider the various cases for 
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P”- S. If the coequations to which a rule is applied occur in &, we can take P’=S, 
and apply the same rule to the corresponding coequation in Q” to get Q’ with P’.%Q’. 
If the Communication rule is applied to some x I u in E-, and some X(P)“’ I Ui for 
which C‘i = x (the only possibility by the condition on names in E incorporated into the 
definition of a), then again the corresponding rule can be applied to Q” to obtain Q’ 
such that P’:&Q’, where P’=S. The final case to be considered is when some rule is 
applied to one of the coequations X(P)“’ I vi. Without loss of generality (by the 
Magical Mixing rule), we can take i= 1. Now there are three sub-cases. 
(i) The Read rule is applied, say with vi =?v’. In this case, we have S-* P’, 
Q" ++ Q’, where 
P’=K, @“‘, I”’ 1 J(Q,sl, tS’ 1 v’, 
Z(R)S’IU2)...) z(R)“” I vk;G [Z”, . , Z”“/j”‘, . , j”“], 17’. 
(ii) The Discard rule is applied, with u1 = _. In this case, we have S-* P’, 
Q” - ’ Q’, where 
P’=E, xsz I jT(&, ) .fSk I J(Q)=, 
Z(P)“’ I c2 ) . . . ) X(P)“” I L&KJ[l/jS’], 3 
Q’=E, F(R)“’ -L u2, . , z(R)“” I c’~;IC[Z’~, , z”““/j”‘, . . . , j”“][:/Is’], 17’. 
(iii) The Copy rule is applied, with vi =u’@c”. In this case, we have S-* P’, 
Q” - + Q’, where 
P’=E, .ySl’ J_ J(&“, ,A,, 1 j(Q”)s”, ,= 1 P(&, ,,, ) ,Ak 1 P(Q)=, 
X(P)“” I u’, X(P)“” I u”, X(P)“’ I u2, . ..) X(P)“” I ak;KJ[j”“@J”“/js’], V’ 
Q’= E, F(R)“” I u’, Z(R)s” I u”, F(R)“* I liz, , z(R)“” I vk; 
61 [?I, , 2=/y ) . ) L;Sk] [ysl’@~““/~sI], C’, 
Now we can use 8 to prove that Cut(OfCourse(a(PQ)), Q)U 5 
OfCourse(P)QQJj. We define a (finite or infinite) sequence (P,, QJ, with P,,52Qn for all 
II, as follows: 
l PO = OfCourse(P)QQ, Q. = Cut(OfCourse(o(PQ)), Q). 
l If P,, is in normal form, then the sequence terminates at n. Otherwise, choose some 
P” with P,,--+ P”, and then use the fact that P&Q,, to obtain P,+ i, Q,,+ I such 
that P” -*pn+~> Qn -'Q n+lrandP,+l~Q,+~. 
Now suppose that OfCourse(P)QQ 0. There are two cases: 
l If OfCourse(P)QQ has an infinite +-sequence, then applying Lemma 7.10, we 
can argue by induction that each P, has an infinite --sequence, and hence that 
the sequence (P,,, QJ is infinite. This means that (Q,J is an infinite -+-sequence. 
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If OfCourse(P@Q +* S, where S is a noncanonical normal form, then applying 
Determinacy and Lemma 7.10, some P, in the above sequence is a noncanonical 
normal form. Clearly P,,&!QN then implies that Q,, is a noncanonical normal form. 
In either case, we see that 
OfCourse( fi 3 Cut(OfCourse{cr(OfCourse(~)~)), Q) T/, 
and so 
Cut(OfCourse(a(PQ)), Q) l,l * OfCourse(P)eQ u, 
as required. 
(15) All: 
I- O;f:r, t:A 
FO;r:r, t:V’r.A 
(*) 
Let P=O;i, t and fix qeTEnv, Qe[f’nq. We must show that for all Qt[(V’a.A)‘jq, 
PQQ IJ Reasoning as in the case for Par, it suffices to consider QEF(U)’ for some 
U~42, where F=LU.[AJq[ CIF+ U]. By the eigenvariable condition I[r’j v]= 
[T’~~[c~I+U], so by the induction hypothesis (with respect to y[cx~+U]), F’OQ 1. 
(16) Exists: 
t O;r:f, t:A[Bjr] - 
i-- O;t:r, t:3cr. A 
Let P=O;f, t and fix VETEnv, QE[~~~v. We must show that for all 
;;tSz.A)‘Jq, F’QQU. By induction hypothesis, for ail R~([A[B/~j~jfil, PORJJ. 
~ACW4i]v=[A+M-+ [B]Y/J=F(C~)‘, 
where F=i.U.[IA’jq[ x F+ U], U = [I34 q. (It is just at this point in the proof that 
second-order comprehension is used.) Hence ~(PQ)EV((F)‘=([(~X. A)Ljj v)‘, so 
Cut(a(PQ), Q)JJ But Cut(o(P&, Q)+* POQ, so PQQJJ. D 
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 7.17, we get the following theorem. 
Theorem 7.18 (Convergence). PE2 t O;i:T =S O;Il,l. 
Proof. By Theorem 7.17, 
PE2 k 0;7:r + /= @;I:l-. 
Now choose VETEnv, Q~[r’Jrl, and conclude that PQl.l, which implies Pl.l by 
Lemma 7.13. q 
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7.3. Canonical vs. cut:free 
We would expect that the distinction between canonical and cut-free arises in 
practice only because of the lazy types: we do not fully evaluate proofs of lazy types in 
advance of the information telling us which arm of a case statement is to be evaluated 
(a), or how many copies are required (!). Our task in this subsection is to turn this 
expectation into a theorem. This will also provide a nice illustration of the use of 
acyclicity, which guarantees “deadlock freedom”. 
Proposition 7.19. If PE, t O;t:r, O;iU Z;ii, and r does not contain any occurrences of 
&, ! or 3, then PL 1 ‘(ii) =@ 
Proof. We sketch the proof only, as the result is not surprising, and the details would 
be quite lengthy. The idea is to introduce a typed version of PE2 ~ in the “Church 
style” (cf. [4]) ~ in which the proof expressions have embedded types; in particular, 
names are decorated with types. The quantifier rules are interpreted nontrivially in 
this version: 
E 0, Z; I:r t:A 
t- o;F:r, n& t):V’x.A 
(*) 
E o;i:r, t:A[B/cr] 
t O;f:r, (13, ~):sx.A 
where c( does not occur free in 0 in the For All rule. The rules of the linear CHAM are 
modified in a fairly obvious fashion, the most interesting case being the Communica- 
tion rule, which becomes: 
fIX~,X“QU - tlu 
(Note that t: Al, U: A, so the new coequation is still well-typed.) Also, there is one new 
reaction rule, for the quantifier forms: 
/Icc.(O;t) I (B, U) - 0 [B/x], t [B/x] -L U 
The previous results of this section can be transferred to this typed version of the 
system. Now consider the following property of typed proof expressions P: 
For all t: A occurring in P, if A does not contain any occurrences of &, ! or 3, then 
P-l ‘(t)=@ 
This property is easily checked to hold for derivable proof expressions, and to be 
preserved under the transition relation. Stripping off the types again, this establishes 
the Proposition, 0 
The appearance of 3 in the hypotheses of this proposition should not be a surprise. 
3 provides “information hiding” (cf. [36]), and the information hidden may well 
include the use of lazy types. 
Theorem 7.20. If PE2 F O;t:r, r does not contain any occurrences of &, ! or 3, and 
O;tl,l P, then P is cut+ee. 
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Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that P=E;U is not cut-free, i.e. that E contains 
some coequation x _L r. By linearity, there must be another occurrence of x in P, either 
elsewhere in 3, or in the main body tr. However, an active occurrence in U would 
contradict P canonical, while a passive occurrence is precluded by the assumption on 
r and Proposition 7.19. So the other occurrence must be in 3, and we have 
t _x-u_y-... 
(note that we cannot have u=x, since P is canonical). Using the same reasoning, we 
can continue this path indefinitely, but since Y(P) is finite, we must eventually get 
a cycle, contradicting the acyclicity of P. 0 
We give some examples to illustrate the use of this theorem. Firstly, note that the 
unique cut-free proof of 1 is the axiom 
and the only cut-free proofs of 1 @ 1 are 
E;*:l k;*:l 
k;inl(*):l F;inr(*):l @ 1 
So we can think of 1 @ 1 as a type Boo1 of taking say tt = ;inl(*), 
ff = ;inr(*). Any proof of type Boo1 (containing cuts) will yield a proof expression 
cut-free, i.e. Q = tt or Q = ff. So any computation of type 
Bool will yield an “honest to God” explicit boolean value. 
If we now consider the standard representation 
V’r.(?(!cc 0 &)79?%_YB) 
essential use of the 
exponential here is in the “successor” function, 
algebraic data-types 
semantics yields fully cut:free proofs at all observable 
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8. Implementation notes 
Firstly, we consider a sequential implementation of proof expressions. The main 
point is to show that the “magical mixing” of the linear CHAM can in fact be 
implemented in a simple and efficient way. The implementation uses two data 
structures: a stack of coequations to be processed, and a name queue. The internal 
representation of names is as pointers to entries in this queue. Such an entry can be in 
one of two states: empty OY pending. Initially, the entry for each name is empty. When 
a coequation x i t is encountered on the coequation stack, the name queue entry 
pointed to by N is inspected. If it is empty, the state is changed to pending, and t is 
stored there. If it is pending, with some term u stored there, then the entry is deleted 
from the name queue (and returned to the free store, since there can be no other 
references to it), and the coequation r I u pushed on the coequation stack. This 
implements the Communication rule. All the other reaction rules can be implemented 
very straightforwardly (note that the Copy rule requires the creation of new entries in 
the name queue). 
It is worth pausing at this point to note that this very simple implementation, with 
no closures, environments or garbage collection, supports a very powerful higher 
order functional programming language (system F), and both lazy and eager modes of 
evaluation. 
Now we consider the prospects for a parallel implementation. We assume the 
following architecture: a network of uyents, i.e. processor-memory pairs, each capable 
of sending data to any other. The coequations are distributed over this network. Each 
agent executes an instance of the sequential interpreter described above, with a co- 
equation stack and name queue held in its local memory. However, names x are now 
represented by pairs (i, /), where i is the (network-wide unique) identifier of the agent 
on whose name queue the entry for x is held, and I the location in the local memory of 
agent i for that entry. So names ~ and only names - are represented by global 
addresses. The only difference to the way each interpreter works is that when 
a coequation x I t is encountered, with x = (i, /), it must be sent to agent i for further 
processing (and, of course, incoming requests of this kind must be handled). 
As in the Sherlock Holmes story, the main point about this implementation scheme 
is the dog that didn’t bark. In particular: 
l The on/~: requirement for inter-agent sharing and synchronization arises from the 
handling of names as described above. This seems much simpler than recent 
proposals e.g. for architectures to perform parallel graph reduction [23]. 
l There are no centralized resources. Indeed, there are no distinguished nodes in the 
network. Each agent runs an instance of the same program. 
l The elimination of garbage collection is probably of much greater value in a paral- 
lel implementation that a sequential one. 
l There are good prospects for applying static analysis techniques to obtain “good” 
mappings of sets of coequations onto the agent network, e.g. to optimize “locality of 
reference”, so that most of the time when a name (i, 1) is encountered in an agent j, 
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i is “near”j, thus reducing the cost of communication between them. In particular, 
by linearity channels are used exactly once, so to determine the “strength” of the 
connection between terms t and u, we can simply count ~/U(t) n .h”(u). (Contrast this 
with occam [28] or CSP [19], where what matters is not the number of channels 
two processes have in common, but the number of times the channels will be used.) 
A mapping algorithm could then attempt to optimize locality of reference by 
making the distance between two coequations inversely proportional to the 
strength of their connection. 
Of course, this is far from the whole story. One significant point is the need for 
load-bahnciny, i.e. maintaining an even loading of coequations over the network. 
However, even here the structure of the linear CHAM offers some support. The only 
rule which increases the size of the proof expression is the Copy rule, so this provides 
a natural place for load-balancing to be performed. Again, one might hope to use 
static analysis techniques to “compile in” load balancing, keeping a good trade-off 
with locality of reference. 
The remarks in this section are speculative; detailed work is needed to evaluate the 
ideas. However, I believe that they do have genuine promise. The key point is that the 
closer marriage of mathematical form with computational content in linear logic 
seems to offer much better possibilities for efficient implementations to arise naturally, 
from the logical structure of the language. 
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